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The timing of actions by firms plays an important role in industrial economics. It 
is key to strategic advantage in oligopoly models whether firms compete on quantity or 
on price. In a vertical relationship between input suppliers and final-good manufacturers, 
a firm which chooses a strategy first will take into account the response by those firms 
moving second and different sequence of play leads to different market outcomes. In my 
dissertation, I study the determinants and implications of the timing of firm actions in a 
variety of scenarios. In my first two essays, I examine how market leadership may arise 
endogenously in oligopoly models and focus on the effect of information about uncertain 
market demand. My first essay studies a quantity game and I identify the circumstance 
under which a perishable information asymmetry regarding stochastic demand causes 
market leadership. In an information acquisition game, I show that Stackelberg 
equilibrium in the full game is supported only when firms have different costs of 
information. My second essay considers a duopoly in which firms supply a differentiated 
product and compete on price. I find that different equilibrium outcomes arise under 
different information structures. Under asymmetric information, a firm’s information 
advantage leads to a strategic disadvantage of leading in the price game. The time value 
of information may well be negative, contrasting with results in the first essay. In my 
third essay, I consider a vertical relationship in which a supplier sets the price of an input 
and the firm that produces the final good must choose how much to invest in some 
complementary input or process. Two models with different sequence of firm actions are 
studied and yield different pricing strategies for the upstream monopolist. Interestingly, a 
 
 v 
change of the sequence from one model (the upstream firm commits to input prices first) 
to the other (the upstream firm sets input prices after investments are made) benefits all 
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CHAPTER I  
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
A critical part of market competition in industrial economics is the timing of 
actions by firms. When firms interact strategically in an oligopoly, an important 
consideration is whether they act simultaneously or sequentially (and if so, in what 
sequence). It was first emphasized by von Stackelberg (1934) that a sequential play 
equilibrium (which is later referred to as Stackelberg equilibrium) differs from the 
simultaneous play outcome (which is referred to as Cournot equilibrium for quantity 
competitions and Bertrand equilibrium for price competitions). In a linear quantity 
oligopoly with constant marginal production cost, the Stackelberg leader payoff is higher 
than the Cournot payoff which is again higher than the Stackelberg follower payoff. In 
other types of industrial relations such as interactions between input suppliers and final-
good manufacturers, the sequence of play also affects the strategic interaction between 
the firms. A firm which chooses a strategy first will take into account the response by 
those firms moving second. Different sequence of play leads to different market 
outcomes. 
The timing of firm actions is key to strategic advantage in oligopoly models 
whether firms compete on quantity or on price. Gal-Or (1985) studied first- and second-
mover advantages in general duopoly models. He showed that the relative magnitudes of 
equilibrium payoffs, being a leader or a follower, depend on the slope of the reaction 
curves. With downward sloping reaction curves, leading is preferred to being a follower 
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and there is first-mover advantage. Usually a quantity game falls into this category and 
commitment is valuable. With upward sloping reaction curves, being a follower is 
preferred and there is second-mover advantage. Usually a price game falls into this 
category and flexibility, instead, has a value. The comparison of firm payoffs between a 
simultaneous play equilibrium and a sequential play equilibrium is less straightforward. 
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) showed that a player’s leadership payoff exceeds his payoff 
in simultaneous play because one can choose any point on the other player’s reaction 
curve including the simultaneous moving point. This apparently applies to duopoly 
models in which firms use their output levels or product prices as strategies. However, all 
these results are derived assuming that firms have perfect information about market 
demand. They may fail to hold when market demand is stochastic and firms have to make 
a choice based on a distribution instead of each realization of the market demand.  
A vertical relationship between an upstream firm and a downstream firm differs in 
nature from firms in a duopoly. The actions taken by the firms are in different spaces. 
Suppose the upstream firm sets the price of the intermediate good, while the downstream 
firm chooses the output level and how much to invest in a complementary process that 
transform the intermediate good into the final good. The sequence of these actions 
significantly affects the strategic interaction between the firms. Although the choice of 
output level by the downstream firm is determined in the last stage, the order of upstream 
firm’s input price setting and the downstream firms’ investment choice can be in either 
way. For example, an upstream monopolist can either commit to an input price schedule 
before the downstream firms undertake an investment to lower production cost, or the 
upstream monopolist may remain flexible and set the input price after observing 
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downstream firm’s chosen production technology. How will market outcome be changed 
under different timing and how it impacts the profits of the firms? 
In my dissertation, I study the determinants and implications of the timing of firm 
actions in a variety of scenarios in industrial economics. In my first two essays, I examine 
how market leadership may arise endogenously in oligopoly models and focus on the 
effect of information about uncertain market demand. My first essay studies a quantity 
game in which firms choose to produce in one of two periods. The circumstance under 
which a perishable information asymmetry regarding stochastic demand causes market 
leadership is identified. In the duopoly case, the firm that knows its competitor has a 
temporary information advantage may choose to act as the follower. A tradeoff is made 
between the strategic value of timing and the information value of choosing a quantity 
with knowledge of realized demand. High demand volatility leads to Stackelberg 
competition with the information advantaged firm leading. In the  -firm case, a 
Generalized-Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot (GSNC) equilibrium
1
 (with multiple leaders and 
multiple followers) emerges endogenously. In a duopoly information acquisition game, I 
find the time value of information is strictly positive. Both symmetric and asymmetric 
outcomes are possible when information is costly. However, Stackelberg equilibrium in 
the full game is supported only when firms have different costs of information. 
My second essay studies a price game in which firms supply a differentiated 
product and compete on price. Price competition differs from quantity competition in that 
following is usually preferred to leading since the follower can undercut the leader’s 
                                                 
1 Sherali (1984) defined a GSNC equilibrium by extending the simple Stackelberg structure into multiple 
simultaneously playing leaders and multiple simultaneously playing followers.  
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price. Different from the result under no uncertainty that only sequential play is a pure 
strategy equilibrium, with both firms uninformed in the first period, simultaneous play in 
the second period emerges as the unique equilibrium when the variance of the demand 
shock is high. With firms asymmetrically informed, the sequential play with the 
information advantaged firm leading may be the unique equilibrium. Even when both 
sequential moves are equilibria, I show the equilibrium with the advantaged firm leading 
risk dominates the other. A firm’s information advantage leads to a strategic disadvantage 
of leading in the price game. I then consider an information acquisition stage in which 
firms can choose either to buy or not to buy information. I find both firms buying 
information is not an equilibrium even if information is free. The time value of 
information may well be negative, given the other firm’s information choice. This 
contrasts with the result in the first essay.  
In my third essay, I consider a vertical relationship in which a supplier sets the 
price of an input and the firm that produces the final good must choose how much to 
invest in some complementary input or process. Greater investment reduces the 
production cost of the final good. I then analyze two models with alternative timing, 
whether the investment occurs prior to the time the input price is set, or afterward. The 
upstream firm and the downstream firms strategically choose the input price and 
investment level, and this interaction depends crucially on the timing of their actions. 
Interestingly, not only the downstream firms but also the upstream monopolist prefers the 
sequence of play in the latter model, i.e. it benefits from committing to prices before 
investments are undertaken. Considering that consumer surplus is also improved due to 
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higher output, a change of sequence of play from the first model to the second constitutes 
a strict Pareto improvement. 
My first essay contributes to the literature in that it studies the effect of a 
perishable (instead of a permanent) information advantage on firms’ timing choices. 
Clear-cut equilibrium results are obtained in the duopoly model and are extended to the 
general oligopoly case. Demand uncertainty in price games have not been modeled in the 
endogenous timing literature and my second essay fits this gap. Many of the results are 
quite interesting and contrast with previous findings. In both the quantity and price 
competition setting, I find that a perishable information advantage may give rise to 
market leadership with the information advantaged firm leading. However, since leading 
is preferred to following in the quantity game but not in the price game, the time value of 
information is different in these models. This further advances our understanding about 
the two forms of market competition in industrial organization. The results in my third 
essay that different sequence of firm actions in the vertical structure leads to substantially 
different market outcomes and one sequence Pareto dominates the other are new to the 
literature. Many related topics are open for future researches. 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Essay 1 is presented in 
Chapter II, Essay 2 is presented in Chapter III and Essay 3 is presented in Chapter IV. 
Chapter V concludes all the findings from the essays. To facilitate reading, all proofs of 





CHAPTER II  
ESSAY 1: INFORMATION VALUE UNDER DEMAND 
UNCERTAINTY AND ENDOGENOUS STACKELBERG 
COMPETITION 
 
In an oligopoly model with firms choosing to produce in one of two periods, I 
identify the circumstance under which a perishable information asymmetry regarding 
stochastic demand causes market leadership. In the duopoly case, the firm that knows its 
competitor has a temporary information advantage may choose to act as the follower. A 
tradeoff is made between the strategic value of timing and the information value of 
choosing a quantity with knowledge of realized demand. High demand volatility leads to 
Stackelberg competition with the information advantaged firm leading. In the  -firm 
case, a Generalized-Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot (GSNC) equilibrium (with multiple 
leaders and multiple followers) emerges endogenously. In a duopoly information 
acquisition game, I find the time value of information is strictly positive. Both symmetric 
and asymmetric outcomes are possible when information is costly. However, Stackelberg 






Two critical ways that a firm may have an advantage over competitors are 
superior information (regarding uncertain demand, for example), and the strategic value 
of market leadership. An important question is, can an information advantage enable a 
firm to achieve leadership in a market? Put differently, if a firm that is known to be better 
informed than competitors leads a market, will its competitors choose to follow? How 
then does this impact the value of information? 
 As I discuss below, this question has been studied in some earlier work, but a key 
assumption has been that the information known by an informed firm (e.g. the realization 
of an uncertain market demand) is never directly revealed to uninformed firms regardless 
of the timing of their actions. Consequently, a signaling game arises with uniformed 
firms possibly able to infer some information from the actions of the informed firm if 
they act as a follower in the market. This signaling dynamic is interesting but generates a 
complex strategic environment which limits the analysis and does not lead 
unambiguously to leadership by an informed firm in equilibrium. I assume instead that 
any information advantage is perishable. That is, a firm may ―get a jump‖ on competitors, 
becoming informed about realized demand earlier than others and thus have the 
possibility of acting in the market based on this information at a time when other firms 
can only act based only on expectations. However, if those competitors choose to act as 
followers, they can act after also becoming fully informed. 
 To understand my model, consider that in many markets firms may make a choice 
whether to be ―close‖ to the market, which may entail geographic or other proximity that 
gives the firm an early signal of market demand. If this proximity comes at a cost, some 
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firms may choose to incur it, while others do not. For example, a domestic producer may 
have this advantage of proximity relative to a foreign producer of a good, but the foreign 
producer may have lower production costs. Information advantage may also be obtained 
simply through more extensive and costly effort at forecasting demand. In either of these 
cases the information advantage would likely be perishable—an advantage of timing in 
the receipt of information.  
I study firm behavior in a quantity-setting model with stochastic demand. In my 
setting, an information advantaged firm has a dominant strategy of playing first, while a 
disadvantaged firm faces a tradeoff between the strategic value of acting earlier (not 
ceding leadership to the informed firm) and the value of acting while fully informed. It 
prefers being an informed Stackelberg follower to being an uninformed Cournot player 
when the variance of the demand shock is high, and Stackelberg competition therefore 
arises endogenously. The time value of information lies in confronting other firms with a 
choice between a strategic disadvantage and an information disadvantage.  
One advantage of my assumption that an information advantage is perishable is 
that, unlike previous papers that studied endogenous market leadership arising with an 
information asymmetry, I am able to model the quantity competition game for an  -firm 
oligopoly. I show that a Generalized-Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot (GSNC) equilibrium 
arises for     firms, with all informed firms acting as leaders and some (but not 
necessarily all) uniformed firms acting as followers.  
Finally, I am able to identify equilibrium information acquisition for the duopoly 
case. The value of knowledge of realized demand increases with the variance of the 
distribution of possible demand shocks. As is intuitive, I find that when this variance is 
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sufficiently high both firms will incur the cost of an early signal of demand, when the 
variance is low neither firms will obtain this information, and an intermediate range 
exists where only one firm becomes informed in equilibrium. It is interesting, however, 
that if both firms face the same cost of obtaining information, market leadership never 
arises endogenously. This is because in those circumstances where information is 
asymmetric (only one firm obtains the information), the equilibrium of the game involves 
the uninformed firm choosing not to act as a follower but rather as an uniformed Cournot 
competitor. Endogenous market leadership may arise, but only when the cost of 
information differs between firms. 
Market leadership may have value if a firm benefits by committing to a particular 
action (output) and compelling other firms to react to it. Gal-Or (1985) showed that if the 
reaction function of the follower is downward sloping the leader earns higher profits than 
the follower. In a quantity duopoly with linear demand and constant marginal costs, a 
firm’s payoff from playing Stackelberg leader is higher than the payoff from playing 
Cournot, which is again higher than that from playing Stackelberg follower. In this essay 
I will refer it as the strategic value of timing. Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) modeled what 
they termed ―extended games with observable delay‖ to study endogenous sequencing 
games. Extended games entail players making a choice of the timing of their action, in 
addition to the underlying action choice (e.g., quantity or price in models of firm 
competition). In this model, firms announce at which time they will choose an action and 
are committed to it in the game of action choices that follows. Hamilton and Slutsky 
showed that the equilibrium has a simultaneous play subgame unless payoffs in 
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sequential play Pareto dominate those in a simultaneous play.
2
 In their discussion, 
information is complete and there is no uncertainty. 
Several subsequent papers incorporate demand uncertainty into models of 
endogenous sequencing. Typically the intercept term of market demand has a random 
component. Because a firm’s profit function is convex in the demand intercept, the 
expected payoff from acting with knowledge of the realization of the random shock is 
higher than that from acting based on expected demand. This is the information value of 
acting with knowledge of demand. Spencer and Brander (1992) consider a duopoly 
setting in which one firm has the option of choosing a quantity before the demand 
uncertainty is resolved. They show that when the variance of the random intercept is low, 
the firm would choose to pre-commit. But if both firms have this option, only Cournot 
equilibrium could possibly arise.  
Mailath (1993) was the first to analyze a signaling game based on asymmetric 
information about market demand. He assumed demand could take on three possible 
values (low, medium, high). The informed firm in this model can choose either to move 
earlier than the uninformed firm at the cost of possibly revealing its private information, 
or move simultaneously. He gave an example of a patent expiring firm’s capacity choice 
when facing the entry of another firm. The incumbent may choose a quantity before the 
entrant or simultaneously with the entrant. It was shown that in the unique stable 
outcome, the informed firm moves first regardless of its private information. Note that 
here the uninformed firm does not have the option to move early (i.e. only the choice to 
                                                 
2 In another model called extended games with action commitment (firms can play early only by selecting 
an action to which it is then committed), Stackelberg equilibria are the only equilibria in undominated 




lead is studied, not the choice to follow). Normann (2002) extended Mailath’s model by 
allowing both the informed firm and the uninformed firm to move early.
3
 He found that 
although Stackelberg equilibrium with either firm being the leader may emerge, Cournot 
equilibrium results endogenously for most parameters. These papers basically focus on 
how asymmetric information leads to endogenous timings of firm actions. A natural 
question is, considering how the sequence of play may be affected by information 
asymmetry, is information valuable and will firms buy information? The only paper that 
has addressed this is Daughety and Reinganum (1994). Instead of the intercept term 
having several types, they let the demand slope take two types and allowed firms to 
acquire information. They showed that if acquiring information is costly, the typical 
equilibrium involves only one firm acquiring information. Both firms acquiring 
information is an equilibrium if and only if information is free.  
In these signaling models, at most three types of demand are considered. By 
focusing on different timing of information, my analysis avoids the complication and the 
possibility of no separating equilibrium in signaling games with too many types.
4
 A 
general random demand intercept is assumed. Also, I assume it may cost a firm a lump-
sum expenditure or a higher marginal production cost (or both) to obtain timely 
information. Examples of the former include firms buying information from some market 
research agency or doing forecasting on their own. For the latter, having earlier 
information may require a firm’s locating close to the end market. For instance, a steel 
company which locates near a city, and thus is better informed, may have higher 
                                                 
3 In his earlier paper (Normann 1997), a similar analysis was done using the model of extended game with 
action commitment. Cournot equilibrium is eliminated in undominated strategies. 
4 As was noted by Gal-Or (1987), there is no separating equilibrium if the second mover does not have any 
private information about the demand, which is generally stochastic. 
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production cost than if locating near iron ore mines or cheap labor. Another example 
arises if an international firm’s having fast access to demand information in a foreign 
market requires its presence in that country.  
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. In section 1.2, I study firms’ 
timing and output choices in a duopoly under information asymmetry, that is, one firm 
has earlier knowledge of the realization of the demand than the other firm. The result is 
then extended to the  -firm case. In section 1.3, I analyze firms’ information acquisition 
decisions. I find both symmetric and asymmetric information acquisitions may arise 
when information is costly. The time value of information is strictly positive. In section 
1.4, I conclude this essay and discuss future work.  
 
1.2 The Model 
I model a homogeneous product market in which firms compete in quantities, and 
initially assume a duopoly. Inverse market demand is linear with a stochastic intercept: 
       . Aggregate output is the sum of two firms’ outputs,        , and 
    is the expected value of demand intercept and        is a random shock with 
mean  and variance     . Without loss of generality, I set the coefficient on   to one 
by the appropriate adjustment of units of output. Also, I assume the support of   is such 
that every firm produce a strictly positive quantity throughout my considerations.
5
 
I adopt the model of extended games with observable delay in Hamilton and 
Slutsky (1990). Extended games entail players making a choice of the timing of their 
                                                 
5 As we will see, this requires          . It simplifies analysis by avoiding shut-down considerations. 
However,      may still be symmetric or asymmetric around 0. 
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action, in addition to the underlying action choice (i.e. output). In this model, firms 
announce at which time they will choose an action and are committed to it in the game of 
action choices that follows. The basic quantity game is played in two periods,   ,   . At a 
prestage, both firms make a decision either to produce in period    or    and this 
becomes common knowledge. If one firm chooses to produce in    and the other   , 
Stackelberg equilibrium arises in the basic game. If both firms choose to produce in the 
same period,    or   , a Cournot equilibrium obtains. I assume that an information 
asymmetry exists in the following way. Firm 1 learns the demand shock at the beginning 
of period   , while Firm 2 learns it at the beginning of period   . As discussed in the 
introduction, Firm 1 has a perishable information advantage because the demand 
uncertainty that Firm 2 faces at    is resolved at   .  
I assume Firm 1’s information advantage is obtained through information 
acquisition activities (that incur a fixed cost    , or a higher marginal production cost 
   , or both).  I will discuss in the next section an information acquisition stage, but 
here simply assume that Firm 1 alone has this information and incurs the associated cost. 
Denote Firm 1’s marginal cost of production as      , where    , while Firm 2 has 
marginal cost  . I define       to simplify notation. To ensure that both firms 
produce a positive quantity for any sequence of play, I assume   
 
 
 . Note a fixed cost 
would be sunk in the analysis of timing and output choices. The parameters,  ,  ,  , and 
   are common knowledge. 
Absent demand uncertainty, a firm earns greater profit as a Stackelberg leader 
than as a Cournot player, which in turn yields greater profit than being a Stackelberg 
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follower. This is the strategic value of timing (i.e. the value of leading or not following). 
On the other hand, knowledge of the demand shock is directly valuable because a firm’s 
profit function is convex in the demand intercept      . Without information regarding 
realized demand, a risk-neutral firm’s optimal output is determined by the expected value 
of the demand intercept. For any sequence of play, a firm’s expected payoff (taking 
expectations of the distribution of possible demand shocks) is greater when output will be 
chosen with knowledge of demand than if output will be chosen based on expected 
demand. This is the information value of acting with knowledge of demand. In the 
extended game with two production periods, both values will be relevant to Firm 2’s 
timing choice, because in choosing the time of its action it determines whether it will act 
with or without knowledge of the demand shock. 
Restricting attention to subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), the extended game 
can be solved backward by first solving four basic games corresponding to each possible 
choices of timing of the two firms. Denote firm  ’s output and profit as    and   . With a 
superscript,   
 
 and   
 
, they represent firm  ’s output and profit when production is done 
in period   ,      . For Firm 1, since the shock is known in both periods, the objective 
is simply: 
   
  
            
        
where    is the realized value of  , and   
   
                                   
                                                    
 . 
For Firm 2, without knowledge of    in period   , the objective is: 
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where   
   
                                   
                                                    
 . 
If Firm 2 chooses to produce in   , with knowledge of   , then the objective is: 
   
  
                 
Given risk neutral firms, only the expected value (0) and variance (  ) of the distribution 
     affect expected payoffs. I obtain the equilibrium payoffs in each subgame of the 
extended game, the expectation of which gives us the payoffs of the prestage game of 
timing choice as shown in Table 1: 
 
Table 1.1 The Reduced Game of Timing Choice   
  










      
 
 



















      
 
 













From the payoff matrix, we can see the strategic value of timing by comparing the 
payoffs in two periods, given the other firm’s timing choice. The information value is 
represented by the component with   .6 The higher the variance of the demand shock, the 
more valuable to a firm is being informed while choosing a quantity. Note that the SPE of 
the extended game are in one-to-one correspondence with equilibria in the reduced game. 
While Firm 1 has a dominant strategy of producing early, Firm 2’s behavior in 
equilibrium depends on the variance of the demand shock. Define condition (1) as 
follows: 
                                                 
6 If Firm 2 produces in   , it does not observe   and its expected profit does not have this component. Note 
that the magnitudes of information values are different with different sequences of play, not surprisingly. 
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Then the equilibrium of this game is characterized by Proposition 1.1. (All proofs are in 
the Appendix.) 
 
Proposition 1.1: It is a strictly dominant strategy for the informed firm (Firm 1) to act in 
period   . The uniformed firm (Firm 2) will choose to follow, acting in period   , if the 
variance of demand is sufficiently high satisfying condition     above. In this case, 
Stackelberg equilibrium in the output subgame with the information advantaged firm 
leading emerges endogenously. If condition (1) does not hold, both firms act in period    
and Cournot equilibrium arises. 
 
The dominant strategy of Firm 1 is intuitive: it gains no information by waiting to 
produce in    and loses a possible timing advantage. Given that Firm 1 will produce in 
  , Firm 2’s choice is then between being a Cournot player in    and being a Stackelberg 
follower in   . If producing in   , it gains the strategic value of not following, but must 
choose a quantity without knowing the shock. If producing in period   , it learns the 
shock at the cost of being a Stackelberg follower. The magnitudes of these two values 
depend on the parameters,       , as well as the sequence of movement he chooses. By 
comparing the expected payoffs from two periods, I obtain the condition under which 




Using   to denote Stackelberg and   to denote Cournot, I have the following 
equilibrium quantities when firms produce sequentially:  
  
   





      
   





                                                                       
and the Cournot equilibrium quantities: 
  
   





      
   
   
 
                                                                                   
The expected payoffs for the two firms are: 
    
    





          
    





                                    
    
    





          
    
      
 
                                                 
A higher volatility of demand, implying a higher information value, makes Firm 2 
more willing choose to delay production until the demand shock is observed. At the same 
time as Firm 2 switches production to   , Firm 1 will benefit from taking a leadership at 
the cost of a lower information value.
7
 Note that given   , the higher the cost difference 
between the two firms,  , the more likely Firm 2 plays Stackelberg follower. Put 
differently, the greater the cost disadvantage that the information advantaged firm has, 
the more likely a Stackelberg equilibrium occurs. 
It is perhaps counterintuitive that greater cost advantage for Firm 2 increases the 
range of circumstances under which it will choose to be a Stackelberg follower. This 
occurs because the strategic disadvantage of following diminishes with Firm 2’s cost 
                                                 
7 In the Cournot competition, only Firm 1earns an information value (which is     ); in the Stackelberg 
competition, both firms earn it (firm 1 gets      and firm 2 gets      ).  
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advantage. As a result, Firm 2 becomes more likely to wait to capture the information 
value of acting with knowledge of the demand shock. 
Another interesting result following Proposition 1.1 is the relative performance of 





Proposition 1.2: The information disadvantaged firm earns a higher market share and a 
higher profit, ex post, than the information advantaged firm if: (i)     holds and    
    , or, (ii)     does not hold and      .  
 
Consequently, when       , Firm 2 outperforms Firm 1 under a negative 
shock       , no matter whether (1) holds or not. If the competition is Cournot, Firm 1 
internalizes the negative shock alone, since Firm 2 will produce based on expected 
demand. Ignorance of the true state of demand gives Firm 2 a strategic advantage when 
the realized demand is low. If the competition is Stackelberg, Firm 1 internalizes a major 
part of it, and is further harmed by a cost disadvantage. In other words, knowing ―bad‖ 
news first is ―bad‖. However, it is not to say that Firm 1 would rather not know this 
information earlier. It is still better off, compared with not knowing it, in which case both 




                                                 
8 From (4) and (5), we can see that Firm 2 may be better off than Firm 1 ex ante as well, when k is positive. 
More will be discussed in the next section of information acquisition. 
9 A comprehensive study of the value of this information advantage will be done in the next section. Here, 
given the sequence of play, knowing this negative shock is still valuable. 
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□      firms. The result of endogenous sequencing in the two-firm model can be 
extended to an  -firm oligopoly. Suppose instead there are      information 
advantaged firms and           information disadvantaged firms. I call a firm 
learning the demand shock in period    an    firm, and call a firm learning information 
until period    an    firm. With     firms, there will be more than one firm producing 
in the same period. For tractability I now assume equal marginal costs among all firms, 
that is    , so the cost of being informed is fixed.  
As in the duopoly case, those information advantaged firms have a dominant 
strategy to produce early. The information disadvantaged firms need make a tradeoff 
between a strategic value and an information value in selecting a period of production. 
What is different in this N-firm case is that the relative magnitude of these two values 
also depends on the number of firms playing in each period, and the number of 
information advantaged firms in the game. For a given level of uncertainty,   , as more 
   firms delay production to period two, the information value (which has to be shared in 
some way among all the    firms and the delaying    firms) for each    firm decreases. 
At the equilibrium, changing the timing of production would yield a bigger loss than 
gain. Define           
      
           
 
        
         
 
      
 
        
 , the following is proved: 
 
Proposition 1.3: When      the following is pure strategy equilibrium to the extended 
game in the  -firm oligopoly: 
(i) All the    firms leading and all the    firms following, if and only if    




(ii) All the    firms and   of the    firms leading and the rest    firms following, if  
and only if           
                 
 , where             ; 
(iii)All   firms playing Cournot in period   , if and only if  
               
 .  
For any     , the number of leading (and following) firms in pure strategy equilibrium 
is uniquely determined. 
  
Endogenous sequencing results in the more general case of   firms under 
asymmetric information. Following the notion of Sherali (1984), a Generalized-
Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot (GSNC) equilibrium (with multiple firms acting 
simultaneously as leaders and multiple firms acting simultaneously as followers) emerges 
endogenously, when the variance of the demand shock is not too low. For example, 
suppose there are     firms in the market, and only one firm has information 
advantage. A GSNC equilibrium with 2 leaders and 2 followers emerges if        
         , and there would be 3  leaders and 1 follower in the equilibrium if 
                . Instead, if the variance of the demand shock is such that 
         , delaying production for any    firm is not optimal and Cournot 
equilibrium with all firms producing in    arises. 
 
Thus by introducing a random demand shock and focusing on asymmetric timing 
of information, I have obtained some results which are quite different from those in 
models with no uncertainty and signaling games in the endogenous timing literature as 
well. Earlier access to information about a demand shock grants a firm an information 
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value and possibly also a strategic leadership if the other firm chooses to delay 
production. The information value is increasing with the variance of demand shock. The 
interesting tradeoff is: if the variance is low it enjoys the information value alone as the 
other firms choose to produce early; if the variance is high such that information value is 
big, it earns a smaller portion, but with the compensation of a strategic leadership. These 
results may have rich implications on firm decisions in a world where demand 
uncertainty is a fact of life. A firm need decide not only when and how much to produce, 
but also whether to acquire better information. I will next study the firms’ information 
acquisition strategies. 
 
1.3 Information Acquisition 
The literature on endogenous sequencing focuses almost entirely on how an 
assumed asymmetry in information or costs leads to endogenous timing in competition. 
The circumstances under which such an asymmetry could arise have not received much 
attention. Given how the strategic interactions between firms in both timing and output 
decisions are affected by asymmetric information, I can now address firms’ willingness 
to pay for costly information. Moreover, I can determine under what circumstances 
asymmetric information is an equilibrium outcome when both firms have the option of 
buying information.  
Here I add an information acquisition stage before the extended game I analyzed 
for the duopoly case. At this stage, firms simultaneously choose either to buy information 
or not. Information acquisition entails any costly activities enabling a firm to learn the 
demand shock at the beginning of period    in the quantity competition game. Following 
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the previous section, I assume the cost of information takes the form ( ,  ), where 
    
 
 
 is the increase to a firm’s marginal production cost, and     is the fixed cost 
part. Initially I will assume ( ,  ) is the same to both firms. As is common in the 
literature on endogenous sequencing, I consider only pure strategy equilibria.
10
 The full 
game can be solved backward by first solving the extended games corresponding to each 
possible information outcome arising from the information acquisition stage.  
In the duopoly model I consider, there are four possible outcomes in the 
information acquisition stage: (B, B), (B, NB), (NB, B) and (NB, NB), where (B, B) 
represents both firms buying information, (NB, NB) represents both firms not buying, (B, 
NB) represents Firm 1 buying and Firm 2 not, (NB, B) represents Firm 2 buying and Firm 
1 not. Each of these outcomes is associated with an extended game with both timing and 
quantity choices. I have studied the two outcomes with asymmetric information 
acquisition in the previous section, to complete the analysis I must characterize the 
symmetric equilibria as well.  
If both firms buy information, (B, B), then both will learn the realized value of the 
demand shock    in    and produce   
       





  without delaying. This is 
analogous to the case without uncertainty. The expected profit is then     
        
 
 
       
 
 
     for each of the firms.  
If both firms do not buy information, there are possibly two pure strategy 
equilibria existing depending on the variance of the demand shock.  
                                                 
10 Daughety and Reinganum (1994), among others, also focused on pure strategy equilibria. As we will see 
later, when either firm acquiring information is a pure strategy equilibrium, there is also a mixed strategy 




Lemma 1.1: Following the outcome (NB, NB) from the information acquisition stage, the 
extended game has the following pure strategy equilibrium:
11
 




  ; 









      
 
  
  , the extended (timing) game becomes a coordination 
game with two equilibria: both firms act in period T1, and both firms act in period T2 (in 
either case the output game is then of course characterized by Cournot play). However, it 
is easy to see that the equilibrium with a simultaneous play in    payoff-dominates the 
other equilibrium. Following Harsanyi and Selten (1988), this equilibrium can be selected 
as a Nash refinement.
12
 Employing this criterion, I restrict attention to a unique 
equilibrium if both firms do not buy information. If    
 
 
  , I have     
          
 
 
  . Instead, if    
 
 
  , then     
          
 
 
   
 
 
   is the expected payoffs 
for both firms. 
Combined with the payoffs I had in the extended games under asymmetric 
information, I am able to solve the game in the information acquisition stage. To simplify 
                                                 
11 This is the same as the result shown in Spencer and Brander (1992), although they did not explicitly 
employ the model of extended games with observable delay.  
12 They argued that even without a preplay communication, if each player knows the other to be fully 
rational, they should trust each other and play the equilibrium strategies which yield higher payoffs for both. 
Also, a payoff-dominant equilibrium can be the focal point of the players. See e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1991) for more discussion. 
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notations, define   
 
 
              , the right hand side of condition (1). The 
following proposition is obtained: 
 
Proposition 1.4: The following outcomes are pure strategy equilibria in the information 
acquisition stage: 
(i) Both firms buy information, (B, B), if                    
  
 
   
  
 
   
   
 
  . 




                         
 
 
   , or,  
(b)    
  
 






                    . 
(iii) Neither firm buys information, (NB, NB), otherwise. 
 
Proposition 1.4 can be understood as follows. Both firms will buy information 
when the variance of demand is sufficiently high, and condition (i) comes from the 
comparison of profits in symmetric, informed Cournot play with those for an uninformed 
firm under asymmetric information which then chooses the maximum of the profit from 
being a Stackelberg follower or an uninformed Cournot competitor against an informed 
firm. If neither firm acquires information, then the equilibrium may be Cournot play in    
or in   . Each of these alternatives gives rise to different conditions for asymmetric 
information acquisition to occur, conditions (iia) and (iib). Depending on the parameters 
of the model, neither, either, or both of these conditions may be satisfied for some range 
of   . In other words, there may be no range of demand variance for which asymmetric 
 
 25 
acquisition occurs, there may be one range, or there may be two (possibly discontinuous) 
ranges for which this occurs.  
Whether symmetric, asymmetric, or no information acquisition occurs depends on 
the relative magnitudes of the variance of demand shock and the cost parameters ( ,  ) 
which enter into a firm’s payoff function in a way contingent on the sequence of play in 
the basic game. The fact that if the variance of the demand shock is high enough, both 
firms buy information contrasts with the result of Daughety and Reinganum (1994) that 
both firms acquiring information is an equilibrium only if information is free. In their 
paper, extended games with action commitment are employed to study a signaling model 
with two types of demand, and the simultaneous play equilibria are deleted in 
undominated strategies.   
It is worth emphasizing that, rather differently than previous work, I have 
modeled the value of information that is perishable and therefore does not generate a 
signaling dynamic. I find that early information has a strictly positive value, no matter 
whether the other firm acquires information or not. This is shown by comparing the 
expected payoffs with and without purchasing information. If information is free,     
and    , it is a strictly dominant strategy for one firm to choose  , regardless of the 
other firm’s choice. 
Note that the time value of information I study here is different from the concept 
of information value discussed in the previous section. Information value of choosing a 
quantity with knowledge of demand results from that a firm’s profit function is convex on 
the demand intercept and choosing a quantity when knowing the realization of a demand 
shock is ex ante better off than acting according to the expected value, given the sequence 
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of play in the competition. Here, the time value of information to a firm lies exactly in 
that the sequence of play may be affected, knowing the demand shock early or late. When 
the other firm does not buy information, earlier information grants one firm the 
opportunity of enjoying the information value alone (if the other firm produces in   ) or 
taking the leadership (if the other firm produces in   ). When the other firm buys 
information, also acquiring information avoids a firm’s being at an information 
disadvantage (if producing in    without information) or a strategic disadvantage (if 
producing in   ). 
Under the asymmetric information equilibrium, the purchase of information by 
one firm may generate a positive externality benefitting its competitor. If both firms 
acting in    is the equilibrium of the extended game when neither firm buys information, 
then this positive externality will always be present. By acting in   , the uninformed firm 
does at least as well as before (and strictly better if    ). In addition, it can choose to 
delay production if that yields a higher payoff. If both firms producing in    is the 
equilibrium of the extended game when neither firm buys information, it may still be the 
case that the uniformed firm benefits from its competitor buying information if the cost of 
information takes the form of incurring a higher production cost k.
13
 It may in fact be the 
case that the uninformed firm earns a higher expected profit than the firm buying 
information.
14
 That is, it may be that one firm’s acquiring information benefits both and 
actually benefits its competitor more. 
                                                 
13 The uninformed firm is made better off when the other firm buys information under condition (iia) in 
Proposition 4, or, under condition (iib) and          . 
14 The uninformed firm earns a higher expected payoff than the informed firm if    
 
 
   
 
 
     , 
which can be consistent with the conditions in (ii) of Proposition 4. 
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I now turn to the question of when asymmetric information occurs in equilibrium 
such that market leadership arises endogenously. 
 
Proposition 1.5: When  the cost of information represented by ( ,  ) is common to both 
firms, asymmetric information acquisition may occur in equilibrium, but only Cournot 
equilibrium could arise in the extended game. 
 
This result occurs because the two conditions for an asymmetric information 
outcome, as listed in Proposition 1.4, both violate the condition for Stackelberg 
equilibrium in the timing game (condition (1)).  The condition for Stackelberg 
equilibrium is that the variance of demand is sufficiently high, but when this is satisfied it 
must be the case that if the cost of information is sufficiently low and one firm obtains it 
then the other firm will obtain the information as well. 
Asymmetric information acquisition and endogenous market leadership may arise 
when firms differ sufficiently in the cost of information. I will consider the case when the 
marginal cost component does not differ between firms,        , but the fixed cost 
component does. Assume now that firm i’s fixed cost of information is represented by   . 
Without loss of generality, let Firm 1 be the lower cost firm with      . I can prove the 
following result: 
 
Proposition 1.6: Given      , Stackelberg equilibrium arises in the full game, if 
                           
      
  
 
   
  
 
   
   
 




For example, when    ,         
  and         , there exists a range of 
values of    that give rise to asymmetric information acquisition and sequential timing of 
production. The firm with lower information cost acquires information and takes the 
leading role in the quantity competition.  
 
1.4 Conclusion 
In an oligopoly model of two production periods with all firms choosing to 
produce in either period, I have identified the circumstance under which a perishable 
information asymmetry regarding stochastic demand causes market leadership with 
Stackelberg competition emerging endogenously. Importantly, firms that know a 
competitor has a temporary information advantage may choose to act as followers in the 
market. In a general oligopoly model with     firms, a GSNC equilibrium with 
multiple leaders and followers occurs with the number of leaders and followers in 
equilibrium determined by the variance of demand and the number of firms who have 
early access to information. 
The value of the perishable information advantage derives from confronting 
competitors with a choice between the strategic disadvantage of following in the market 
and the information disadvantage of being a simultaneous (Cournot) competitor and 
acting based only on expected demand. Given how the sequence of play and firm payoffs 
are affected under different information structures, symmetric or asymmetric, two natural 
questions are: is early information valuable and what cost will firms be willing to incur to 
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obtain a perishable information advantage? In a duopoly information acquisition game I 
find that unlike the information advantage studied in signaling games, early information 
always has value. Both symmetric and asymmetric outcomes are possible when 
information is costly. However, Stackelberg equilibrium is supported only when firms 
have different costs of information.  
An important direction for future work is the generalization of this model to allow 
for entry and thus identify a competitive equilibrium. In particular, if many potential 
firms can enter either as informed firms with a high fixed cost or uniformed firms with a 
low fixed cost, can it be shown that a zero expected profit equilibrium arises with both 
uniformed firms and informed firms entering? If so, will market leadership arise 
endogenously in some circumstances with uninformed firms choosing to follow? This is a 
very challenging problem because equilibrium entry is greatly complicated by the timing 






CHAPTER III  
ESSAY 2: DEMAND UNCERTAINTY AND ENDOGENOUS PRICE 
LEADERSHIP 
 
In this essay, I consider a duopoly in which firms supply a differentiated product 
and choose to set the price in one of two periods. Market demand is stochastic and the 
uncertainty resolves in the second period.  In the first period, a firm learns only the 
expected demand unless it has chosen to acquire information. Different from the result 
under no uncertainty that only sequential play is pure strategy equilibrium, with both 
firms uninformed in the first period, simultaneous play in the second period emerges as 
the unique equilibrium when the variance of the demand shock is high. With firms 
asymmetrically informed, the sequential play with the information advantaged firm 
leading may be the unique equilibrium. Even when both sequential moves are equilibria, 
I show the equilibrium with the advantaged firm leading risk dominates the other. A 
firm’s information advantage leads to a strategic disadvantage of leading in the price 
game. An information acquisition stage is then studied and I find both firms buying 
information is not an equilibrium even if information is free. The time value of 





Market leadership, arising from for example a cost or information advantage, is an 
important issue in understanding strategic competitions. In quantity competition, the 
intuition that leadership confers an advantage and derives from an advantage is broadly 
confirmed. However, in price competition, this does not hold. Price competition differs 
from quantity competition in that following is usually preferred to leading since the 
follower can undercut the leader’s price. In this context, does a cost or information 
advantage confer unwanted leadership? 
Endogenous timing under asymmetric information has been studied in some 
earlier work (specifically in the context of quantity competitions), but a key assumption 
has been that the information known by an informed firm (e.g. the realization of an 
uncertain market demand) is never directly revealed to uninformed firms regardless of the 
timing of their actions. Consequently, a signaling game arises with uniformed firms 
possibly able to infer some information from the actions of the informed firm if they act 
as a follower in the market. I assume instead that any information advantage is 
perishable. That is, a firm may ―get a jump‖ on competitors, becoming informed about 
realized demand earlier than others and thus have the possibility of acting in the market 
based on this information at a time when other firms can only act based only on 
expectations. However, if the other firm chooses to wait, it can act after also becoming 
fully informed.  
I study the timing of firm actions in a duopoly in which firms supply a 
differentiated product and compete on price. Market demand is stochastic with a random 
intercept term. Uncertainty about the demand resolves in the second period, but in the 
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first period firms learn only the expected value unless information acquisition activities 
have been undertaken. The determination of the sequence of price settings is studied 
under different information structures: symmetric, asymmetric or no information 
acquisitions. I find that simultaneous play may emerge as the unique equilibrium when 
neither firm acquires information. This contrasts with the result in the absence of demand 
uncertainty that only sequential play is a pure strategy equilibrium. There is an 
information value of acting with knowledge of demand: given the sequence of play, 
setting a price according to each realization of the demand shock is ex ante better than 
while without the information.  
Under asymmetric information, I find that the firm with early access to demand 
information may have a first-mover advantage: it enjoys a higher payoff being a leader 
than being a follower. If the information disadvantaged firm leads, it sets a price 
according to expected demand, and this would adversely affect the profits of both firms 
when the realized value of the demand shock is positive. As a result, to avoid this 
possibility, the information advantaged firm may prefer to lead especially when the 
variance of the demand shock is high. The set of equilibria depends on the variance of the 
demand shock as well. When the variance is high, only the sequential move with the 
information advantaged firm leading is an equilibrium. Otherwise, both sequential moves 
are pure strategy equilibria. Following Harsanyi and Selten (1988), I apply the criterion 
of risk dominance and show that the equilibrium with the information advantaged firm 
being the price leader risk dominates the other. Asymmetric information gives rise to 
endogenous price leadership and a firm’s information advantage leads to a strategic 
disadvantage of leading in the price game. 
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Considering how sequence of play resulting firm payoffs are affected by different 
information structures, is early information valuable and will firms be willing to pay to 
obtain it? I model an information acquisition stage and find that both firms acquiring 
information is never an equilibrium even if information is free. With the other firm 
buying information, ignorance of the state of demand in the first period secures a firm’s 
role of being a follower in the price game (which is advantageous). Consequently, the 
time value of information to a firm is (weakly) negative when the other firm buys 
information. Furthermore, because a perishable information advantage makes a firm take 
the less preferred leading role in the price game, a firm that believes its competitor to be 
uninformed may choose to remain uninformed as well to avoid taking a leadership 
position. 
It was first emphasized by von Stackelberg (1934) that timing of firm actions is an 
important aspect of competition in industrial economics when output is the strategic 
variable. A sequential play equilibrium (which is later referred to as Stackelberg 
equilibrium) differs from the simultaneous Cournot outcome. Gal-Or (1985) studied first- 
and second-mover advantages in general duopoly models. He showed that the relative 
magnitudes of equilibrium payoffs, being a leader or a follower, depend on the slope of 
the reaction curves. With downward sloping reaction curves, leading is preferred to being 
a follower and there is first-mover advantage. Usually a quantity game falls into this 
category and commitment is valuable. With upward sloping reaction curves, being a 




While most duopoly models take the sequence of play as exogenously given, 
increasing interest has been to the endogenous determination of the timing in a game. 
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) proposed two models to study endogenous timing, extended 
games with observable delay and extended games with action commitment. In the first 
model, firms announce at which time they will choose an action and are committed to it 
in the basic game of action choices. In the second model, firms can play early only by 
selecting an action to which it is then committed. Subsequent work has applied these 
models to study the timing of actions in some specific type of games, mostly in quantity 
competition.
15
 Two papers have studied endogenous timing in a price game in which 
firms have different production costs. Van Damme and Hurkens (2004) employed the 
action commitment model to study a linear price setting duopoly game and found that 
while both sequential move sequences are equilibria in undominated strategies, the one 
with the lower cost firm leading risk dominates the other sequential move equilibrium. 
Amir and Stepanova (2006) instead used the observable delay model and obtained a 
similar result. The cost efficient firm becomes the price leader under the criterion of risk 
dominance. They also found that the lower cost firm may have a first-mover advantage 
when the difference in cost between the two firms is large. In these models, information 
is complete and there is no uncertainty. The effect of demand uncertainty on the sequence 
of play has not been modeled. This is the gap I fill here. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, I set up the 
stochastic duopoly model and study firms’ timing choices under different information 
                                                 
15 They include Mailath (1993), Daughety and Reinganum (1994), Normann (1997, 2002), Amir and Grilo 
(1999) and van Damme and Hurkens (1999). 
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structures. In section 2.3, I analyze an information acquisition stage in which firms can 
choose to acquire information or not. In section 2.4, I conclude this essay.  
 
2.2 The Extended Games with Timing Choices 
The full game to be studied in this section and the following consists of the 
following stages in a sequence: the information acquisition stage in which firms choose 
whether to buy information and thus obtain an early signal of market demand in the 
pricing stage, the timing choice stage in which firms choose to act in either of two price-
setting periods, and the two-period pricing stage in which firms set the price of their 
products in the period they have chosen. In this section, I will take the information status 
of the firms, which are known to each firm, as given and study endogenous timing under 
each information structure.   
Consider two risk-neutral firms, 1 and 2, in a market. They supply a differentiated 
product and compete on price. The products of the firms are imperfect substitutes and 
demand for firm  ’s product is: 
                   
where        is the stochastic demand intercept with mean    and variance  
 , 
      is the coefficient of cross-price effect,    is the price charged by firm  , 
     , and    is the price charged by firm  ,    .
16
 They produce the products at the 
                                                 
16 This linear form of demand function is widely used in the endogenous timing literature and other 
duopoly models. It can be derived from the utility maximization problem of a representative consumer 
whose utility function takes a quadratic form. For more discussion, see, for example, Vives (1984). The 
stochastic component is added when the coefficient on the linear part of the utility function is stochastic. 
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same constant marginal cost  . Letting            , I can write the demand 
functions as: 
                     
where prices in lower case are net of costs. The random component of the intercept term 
  follows distribution      with        and          . Also, I assume the support 
of   is such that every firm sets a positive price and supplies a positive quantity 
throughout my considerations. That is, I assume the lower support of   is greater than 
  .  
To study endogenous timing of firm actions in the price game, I employ the 
model of extended games with observable delay developed by Hamilton and Slutsky 
(1990). The basic price game is played in two periods,   ,   . At a prestage of timing 
choices, each firm chooses one of the two periods to set the price of its product. Once 
chosen, they are committed to it and the timing choices become common knowledge. If 
one firm chooses to set a price in period    and the other in   , a sequential play 
equilibrium arises in the basic game. If both firms choose to set prices in the same period, 
   or   , I identify a simultaneous play equilibrium. As is common in the endogenous 
timing literature, I only consider pure strategy equilibria.
17
 
Uncertainty about demand resolves in period   . So both firms observe the 
realized state of demand at that time. But in   , firms only know the mean of the random 
shock ( ) to be zero and the variance of the shock (  ) unless information acquisition 
activities have been undertaken. In this section, I take the information structure of the 
                                                 
17 This was the practice by, e.g., Daughety and Reinganum (1994), Damme and Hurkens (2004), Amir and 
Stepanova (2006). Inclusion of mixed strategy equilibria slightly complicates the analyses but does not 
change the qualitative conclusions.  
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firms as given. There are four possible outcomes from the information acquisition stage. 
They are denoted as the following: (B, B) means that both firms choose to buy 
information in the information acquisition stage and as a result will be informed in period 
   in the price game; (NB, NB) means neither firm buys information and they will not be 
informed until in period    ; (B, NB) and (NB, B) represents asymmetric information 
acquisitions and so there are an information advantaged firm and an information 
disadvantaged firm. It is worth noting that my assumption of asymmetric information is 
different from that in the signaling games studied in quantity competition in the literature. 
In those models, there is one informed firm who learns the type of demand from the very 
beginning and one uninformed firm who remains uninformed unless the informed firm 
reveals the type through its quantity choices (signaling). Here, information acquisition 
only grants the firm an earlier knowledge about the realization of the demand intercept, in 
period    rather than    in the price game.
18
 As a result, this information advantage is 
perishable. 
Restricting to subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), I can use backward induction 
to solve the extended games. I first find the equilibria in the basic price games following 
each possible timing choices and then use the equilibrium payoffs of each price game as 
the payoffs of the reduced game in the prestage of timing choices. The SPE of an 
extended game is in one-to-one correspondence with equilibrium in the reduced game. 
There are four extended games following the outcomes from the information acquisition 
                                                 
18 To my knowledge, Spencer and Brander (1992) is the only other paper in the endogenous timing 
literature that employs a similar timing structure of information. However, they consider a quantity game 
and do not allow for information acquisition. So both firms learn the demand intercept only after the 




stage. By analyzing the extended games under asymmetric information, (B, NB) and (NB, 
B), together, there are three cases to be analyzed. 
 
□   Case 1:  Both firms are informed in   . 
If (B, B) is chosen in the information acquisition stage, both firms will learn the 
realized value of the demand shock in period   . This is analogous to the case when there 
is no uncertainty about market demand. The result can serve as a baseline for 
comparisons with the other two cases when demand uncertainty plays a role. 
Let    denote a simultaneous play in period   ,      , and let   and   denote 
leading and following respectively in a sequential play. Let        be the best response 
function of firm  ,      ,    . Then firm  ’s objective function is: 
   
  
             
      
where    is the realized value of  , and   
   
                                      
                                                      
 . 
By solving the maximization problem, we can see the best response function is positively 
sloped:        
        
 
. The simultaneous play equilibrium payoffs are:   
        
       
 , where   
 
      
. The sequential play equilibrium payoffs with firm   being 
the leader and firm   being the follower are:   
              
 , and   
       
       
 , where   
      
       
, and   
          
         
. 
It is easy to verify that with      ,       
 
 
, which means payoffs in a 
sequential play Pareto dominate those in a simultaneous play and there is second-mover 
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advantage: being a follower is preferred to being a leader. As in a quantity competition, 
being a leader is preferred to being a simultaneous player because a firm can choose any 
point on the other firm’s reaction curve including the simultaneous moving point. What is 
different in a price game, with positively sloped reaction curves, is that being a follower 
is better than being a leader since a follower can undercut the other firm’s set price: 
flexibility in the price setting game is valuable. 
I can then solve the reduced game of timing choices in the prestage by using the 
expected payoffs from the price subgames under each possible sequence of play. The 
following lemma is obtained. (All proofs are in the Appendix.) 
 
Lemma 2.1: When both firms are informed about the uncertain demand in period   , 
sequential plays with either firm being the price leader and the other firm being the 




In the equilibrium, the follower’s payoff is higher than the leader’s: 
    
            
       . Positively sloped reaction curves lead to second-mover 
advantage, consistent with Gal-Or (1985). When both firms are informed from the first 
period, the extended game is a coordination game: although both firms want to be the 
follower, one firm would choose to lead if it knows the other firm chooses to set a price 
in   . The next two cases will have at least one firm being uninformed in period   . 
Demand uncertainty then plays a role in that information about the realization of the 
                                                 
19 Apparently, there is also a mixed strategy equilibrium where both firms randomize on choosing    or   .  
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demand shock is valuable and must be considered by the firm that faces uncertainty in the 
first period. The results turn out to be quite different. 
 
□   Case 2: Neither firm is informed in   . 
Following the choices (NB, NB) from the information acquisition stage, both 
firms do not know the realization of the random shock until in period   . For each firm, 
its objective function is the same as in the previous case if it chooses to set a price in   . 
However, in period   , without learning the true value of the demand intercept, its price 
choice is then based on the distribution of the random component  : 
   
  
             
           
where   
   
                               
                                           
 . 
With risk-neutral firms, only the expectation of the random shock matters: a firm sets a 
price as a function of the mean of the demand intercept. Note that a firm’s profit function 
is convex in the demand intercept. For any given sequence of play, setting a price while 
knowing the realized value of the demand intercept is ex ante superior to setting the price 
when only the expected value is known. I will generally refer to this as the information 
value of acting with full knowledge of demand.  
When firms set their prices simultaneously in period   , both prices are based on 
the expected value of the demand intercept. Their expected payoffs are 
    
              , the same as when there is no uncertainty and demand is at its 
mean. In contrast, with simultaneous play in period   , both firms are informed about the 
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realized value of demand and their payoffs are the same as in Case 1. The expected 
payoffs at the prestage can be written as:     
                   . A comparison 
of these payoffs tells us the information value under a simultaneous play. With full 
knowledge of market demand, each firm ex ante enjoys a higher profit than when they are 
uninformed. The magnitude,    , is increasing with the variance of the demand shock.  
In sequential play with firm   being the leader, firm   observes not only firm  ’s 
chosen price but also the realized state of demand. However, firm   must choose a price 
according to its expectation of the demand intercept. Their expected payoffs are 
respectively     
             , and     
                  . Compare the 
expected profits of the leader and the follower, we can notice that being a follower, a firm 
not only has a strategic timing advantage (represented by a bigger coefficient before   ) 
but also can set his price according to each realization of the demand shock (and thus 
enjoy an information value of     ). 
By solving the reduced game in the prestage of timing choices, and defining 
  
  
      
, I have the following result: 
 
Proposition 2.1: When both firms are uninformed about the uncertain demand in period 
  , the following are the only pure strategy equilibria in the extended game: 
(i) Simultaneous play in the second period, if       ; 
(ii) Sequential play with either firm being the price leader and the other firm 




In this case with both firms being uninformed in the first period, the equilibrium 
result differs from that in Case 1 analyzed earlier. It depends on the variance of the 
demand shock. Simultaneous price setting emerges endogenously in the price subgame 
when the variance of the demand shock is large. Relating to my earlier discussion about 
information value, both firms choose to delay their choice of prices and play a 
simultaneous game even though being a price leader is strategically preferred to playing 
simultaneously. When demand is highly uncertain, the incentive to wait for the 
uncertainty to resolve outweighs the strategic considerations and leads to a simultaneous 
play equilibrium. When the variance of the demand shock is low, the strategic timing 
considerations dominate and sequential play again results with either firm acting as the 
price leader. Under sequential play equilibria, it is easy to verify that there is second-
mover advantage as well: firms prefer to be the follower.  
 
□   Case 3: One firm is informed in    and the other not. 
Following the choices ( ,   ) or ( ,   ) from the information acquisition stage, 
one firm learns the realization of the demand intercept in   , but the other does not until 
in   . Without loss of generality, I assume firm   is the information advantaged firm and 
firm   is the information disadvantaged firm. As I have discussed, this advantage in 
information is perishable: it will vanish if firm   chooses not to execute it in time, that is, 
set the price of its product in   . Firm  ’s objective function is the same as in Case 1 since 
it is informed in both periods. For firm  , its choice of price in period    would be based 
 
 43 
on the expectation of the demand shock, while in    it also learns the true state of the 
demand. Its maximization problem is the same as in Case 2. 
By solving backward, I obtain the expected payoffs from each price subgame 
which give the following payoff matrix for the reduced game of timing choice: 
 
Table 2.1 The Reduced Game of Timing Choice under Asymmetric 
Information 
  
 Firm   
T1 T2 
Firm   
T1     
 
 
  ,             ,          
T2     
 
 
  ,             ,          
 
Simultaneous price setting in either period is not an equilibrium, similar to Case 1 
when both firms learn the demand shock from   . With one firm being informed in both 
periods, it always wants to avoid playing simultaneously with the other firm due to 
strategic timing considerations. Again, only a sequential play equilibrium is possible. 
Before I fully characterize the equilibrium outcomes, it is interesting to note that the 
information advantaged firm, firm  , may actually prefer a leading role to a following 
role. This is different from the previous two cases. 
 
Proposition 2.2: Under asymmetric information, if    
  
     
  , the information 
advantaged firm has a first-mover advantage. Otherwise, it has a second-mover 




That the information advantaged firm may prefer being a price leader to being a 
price follower stems from the fact that prices are strategic complements and the profit 
function is convex on the demand intercept. When the realized value of the demand is 
high, both firms should charge a high price and enjoy a high profit. However, if firm   
takes the leading role and sets the price of its product in period   , its choice is made 
according to the mean of the demand. This price is lower than that it would set if firm   
had known the demand information, and makes the follower, firm  , unable to charge a 
price sufficiently high. Although this is to some extent offset when demand is low and 
firm   charges a higher price than it would have charged if it had known demand is low, 
on average, there is some loss in profit to the information advantaged firm because of the 
leader’s ignorance of the true level of demand. This loss is increasing in the variance of 
the random shock. As a result, when the variance of demand shock is very high, as is 
stated in Proposition 2.2, firm   would rather take the leadership role just to prevent the 
other firm setting a low price that is costly to both. First-mover advantage arises in the 
price game under this condition, quite at odds from when firms have symmetric 
information (Case 1 and Case 2).  
When    
  
     
   and firm   has a first-mover advantage, its leading is 
actually the unique equilibrium in the extended game under asymmetric information. 
Generally, equilibria in the extended game are characterized as follows: 
 
Proposition 2.3: Under asymmetric information, the following are the only pure strategy 
equilibria in the extended game: 
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(i) Sequential play with the information advantaged firm being the price leader 
and the disadvantaged firm being the follower, if       . 
(ii) Sequential plays with either firm being the price leader and the other firm 
being the follower, if       . 
 
The condition for a unique equilibrium to arise (with the information advantaged 
firm leading) is the same as the condition in Proposition 2.1 for a simultaneous playing 
equilibrium when both firms are uninformed in the first period. This is not surprising. 
When       , the information disadvantaged firm has a dominant strategy to play 
second. This pushes the information advantaged firm into a leadership position, since it 
will avoid a simultaneous play. Of course, Proposition 2.2 tells us that it may actually 
prefer to be the leader. However, with      , I have 
  
     
  . This means, if 
        
  
     
 , the information advantaged firm prefers being a follower but 
reluctantly takes the leading role in the unique equilibrium. 
When the variance of the demand shock is relatively small, both sequential plays 
are pure strategy equilibria. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) proposed two criteria that can be 
used to make an equilibrium selection: payoff dominance and risk dominance. However, 
payoff dominance does not help in my setting. One equilibrium payoff dominates the 
other if the payoff in this equilibrium is strictly higher than that in the other equilibrium 
for each player. But this is not the case when both sequential moves are equilibria under 




Lemma 2.2: Under asymmetric information, if        such that both sequential 
moves are equilibria to the extended game, no equilibrium payoff dominates the other. 
 
In this type of coordination games with two equilibria existing and the outcome 
relying on players choosing corresponding strategies, there is fundamental risk to each 
player when choosing to play one way or the other. As a result, risk considerations are 
inevitable by rational players and can be used to make equilibrium selections. Following 
Harsanyi and Selten (1988), a risk dominant equilibrium can be interpreted as ―dominant 
in the players’ expectation after due consideration of the risks involved in the initial state 
of uncertainty‖. The original definition of risk dominance is comprised of two concepts, 
the bicentric priors and the linear tracing procedure. Under the initial uncertainty about 
player  ’s strategy, player   has a subjective probability    about player  ’s strategy 
profile. As was argued by Harsanyi and Selten,    has a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. 
For each   , player   has a best response. Integrating the best responses with respect to   , 
a probability profile for player  ’s best strategies,   , is obtained, which forms the 
bicentric prior of player   about player  ’s strategy. The linear tracing procedure assesses 
each equilibrium by adjusting the relative weights players put on one’s bicentric prior and 
the strategy profile of other players in the equilibrium. If some equilibrium point is 
selected in the single feasible path, then this equilibrium risk dominates the other.  
Although this procedure is fairly complicated and very difficult to apply to some 
games, Harsanyi and Selten have shown that it is easy to characterize a risk dominant 
equilibrium in a     game with two Nash equilibria: one equilibrium risk dominates the 
other if the product of deviation losses is larger for the former. With attention being 
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restricted to SPE, I can apply risk dominance to the reduced game of timing choices.
20
 
The following result is obtained: 
 
Proposition 2.4: Under asymmetric information, if        such that both sequential 
moves are equilibria to the extended game, the equilibrium with the information 
advantaged firm leading risk dominates the other equilibrium with the information 
disadvantaged firm leading. 
 
As a result, risk dominance selects the equilibrium with firm   being the price 
leader when       . This is also the more efficient outcome for the industry, since the 
joint profits are higher in this equilibrium than the other one with firm   leading. When 
attention is restricted to the risk-dominant equilibrium in this case, then there is always a 
unique equilibrium under asymmetric information. Regardless of the magnitude of the 
demand volatility, the information advantaged firm acts as the price leader in the 
extended game.  
Note that the information disadvantaged firm gains the most under this 
information structure. Its ignorance of demand information in the first period guarantees 
him a more favorable role in the price competition: following. Being a follower and 
setting the price in   , it enjoys a strategic timing advantage without losing the 
information value because uncertainty eventually resolves in   . To the information 
advantaged firm, however, being pushed into a leadership role in the equilibrium may 
                                                 
20 This is also the method used by Amir and Stepanova (2006). Van Damme and Hurkens (2004) have to 
apply the original definition of risk dominance to assess the whole game since there is no proper reduced 
game with the action commitment model.  
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well be detrimental. As I have shown, when the variance of the demand shock is low, it 
has a second-mover advantage. Earlier knowledge about the true state of demand grants 
him an information value (which he does not necessarily lose even without this superior 
information), but at the cost of becoming the leader in the price game.  
 
From the above analyses, we see that the timing of firm actions in equilibrium 
depends on the information structure. When demand volatility is high and both firms do 
not know the realized value of the market demand until in the second period, the 
information value of acting with knowledge of market demand causes both firms to delay 
price setting. This gives rise to the unique equilibrium of simultaneous play in the 
extended game, which differs from the result that only sequential plays could possibly 
arise in pure strategy equilibrium without uncertainty. The convexity of profit functions 
with respect to the stochastic demand intercept plays an important role in firms’ timing 
choices. However, if one of the firms has a perishable information advantage over its 
competitor, only sequential price setting is possible. When the variance of the demand 
shock is high, the information disadvantaged firm has a dominant strategy to act in    and 
the information advantaged firm takes the leading role to avoid a simultaneous play. Even 
when the variance is low such that both sequential moves are equilibria, the one with the 
information advantaged firm leading risk dominates the other and this equilibrium is 
selected. As a result, one’s information advantage leads to a strategic disadvantage in the 
price game. This raises the interesting question of whether earlier information is valuable. 
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2.3 Information Acquisition 
The literature on endogenous timing focuses almost entirely on how some type of 
exogenous asymmetry, e.g. in information or cost, leads to endogenous timing of firm 
actions in the basic game.
21
 Less attention has been paid to how this asymmetry arises 
and whether it will arise. Considering that the strategic role of firms would be different 
under different information or cost structures, how will firms choose their information 
status or production technology in the first place? This is an interesting and important 
question. I have shown how different information structures lead to different sequence of 
play in the price competition and different firm payoffs. Then is early information 
valuable and will firms acquire information if they have the option to do so? Will the 
different information structures I studied, symmetric, asymmetric and no information, 
result endogenously at the equilibrium? 
Before the extended games in the previous section are played, now I add another 
stage of information acquisition. By saying information acquisition, I mean the general 
costly activities that lead to earlier knowledge about the realized state of demand, at 
period    instead of period    (uncertainty automatically resolves in   ). This includes, 
but not limited to, building a forecasting team on one’s own or signing a contract with 
some third party agency that is able to offer demand information in the first period of the 
price game. I assume the cost of information is    .   
                                                 
21 To my knowledge, the only exception is Daughety and Reinganum (1994) who analyze firms’ 
information acquisition choices. They study a signaling quantity game and use the action commitment 
model. With Cournot equilibrium being eliminated in undominated strategies, they conclude that only one 
firm acquires information when cost of information is low and both firms acquire information only when 
information is free. 
 
 50 
Focusing on SPE, the full game can be solved backward. There are possibly four 
different outcomes from this information stage: (B, B), (B, NB), (NB, B) and (NB, NB). 
Each outcome leads to an extended game I studied before. As I have characterized, if 
both firms buy information, (B, B), both sequential moves are pure strategy equilibria. If 
only one firm acquires information, (B, NB) or (NB, B), the acquiring firm would become 
the leader in the price game. If none of them buy information, (NB, NB), as I have in 
Proposition 2.1, the set of equilibria depends on whether the condition        holds or 
not. If this condition holds, simultaneous play in period    is the unique equilibrium. 
Otherwise, if       , then both sequential moves could arise in pure strategies. 
The reduced game in the information acquisition stage can be obtained by 
plugging in the equilibrium payoffs from the corresponding subgames, here, the extended 
price games with timing choices. Solving each possible equilibrium outcomes, I have the 
following result: 
 
Proposition 2.5: In the information acquisition stage, the following are the only 
equilibrium outcomes in pure strategies: 
(i) Neither firm acquires information, if and only if: 
(a)            
 
 
 , or, 
(b)        
 
   
   ; 




       , or,  
(b)            
 
   
    . 
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That both firms acquire information is not an equilibrium outcome. 
 
Even if information is free, that both firms buy information cannot arise as an 
equilibrium outcome. When both firms learn the realized state of market demand in   , 
one firm takes the leadership role and the other becomes the follower. By deviating and 
letting the other firm have a perishable information advantage, the leading firm could 
instead take the preferred following role without losing the information value: it chooses 
a price observing both the price chosen by the other firm and the realized value of the 
demand shock in   . The following firm also has an incentive to deviate if information is 
costly. Both of these follow from the result that an information disadvantage leads to a 
strategic advantage of following.  
Thus I find a scenario in which early information has a negative value. If the other 
firm buys information, one would not buy and can then take the following role in the 
price game. Moreover, even when the other firm does not buy information, it is likely that 
early information (now a perishable information advantage) is a ―bad‖ to one of the 
firms. The time value of information in this model of price competition can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
Proposition 2.6: Early information has a strictly negative value to one of the firms and 
zero value to the other if its competitor acquires information. Early information has a 
strictly negative value to one of the firms if its competitor does not acquire information 




This interesting result contradicts our usual understanding that better information 
(here earlier information) must be valuable. A perishable information advantage over 
one’s competitor may be strategically harmful, and information as early as one’s 
competitor is definitely harmful in this endogenous timing model of price competition. 
This is different from my conclusion in the first essay when firms compete on quantity. In 
a price game with uncertain market demand in the first period, delaying price setting can 
grant a firm both a strategic timing advantage and an information value of acting while 
informed. If the other firm acquires information, ignorance of the true state of demand 
makes the firm take a following role in the equilibrium. If the other firm does not buy 
information and       , whether earlier information is valuable depends on the role of 
the firm in the price game when both sequential plays are possible. The bottom line is, 
one of them (the firm taking the following role) would find learning the demand 
information earlier than its competitor to make it strictly worse off. If       , the 
firms would play simultaneously and both of them will want to avoid this outcome by 
acquiring information (given that information cost is not too high) although only one 
buys it in equilibrium. 
With that said, very likely only one firm will obtain early information and the 
other not especially when the cost of information is low. This is seen by comparing the 
equilibrium conditions in Proposition 2.5. When   decreases, the intervals in (ii) expand 
and will include all positive values when    . Following this asymmetric information 
structure, market leadership is endogenously determined with the information advantaged 
firm becoming the price leader. The information disadvantaged firm may have a 
dominant strategy to wait and in this case the advantaged firm leading is the unique 
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equilibrium. Even when sequential play with either firm leading is a pure strategy 
equilibrium, risk considerations pushes the information advantaged firm into the leading 
role. When    does fall into the range such that neither firm buys information, the 
equilibrium in the extended game can be either a sequential move or a simultaneous 
move. If            
 
 
 , both sequential plays with either firm being the price leader 
are equilibria. If        
 
   
    (subject to existence of such an interval), 
information value of choosing a price with knowledge of market demand dominates their 
strategic timing considerations and simultaneous play equilibrium emerges.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
In a duopoly model with two price-setting periods and both firms choose to set a 
price in either period, information about the stochastic demand plays an important role. 
When both firms learn the realized demand only until uncertainty resolves in the second 
period, simultaneous play in the second period may emerge as the unique equilibrium. 
This contrasts with the result in the absence of demand uncertainty that only sequential 
play is a pure strategy equilibrium. Under asymmetric information, I find an interesting 
result that the information advantaged firm may have a first-mover advantage. This is due 
to the strategic complementarity of price competition. Letting an uninformed firm to set a 
price first would adversely affect the informed follower as well. Generally, the set of 
equilibria depends on the magnitude of the variance of the demand shock. If the variance 
is high such that the information disadvantaged firm has a dominant strategy to play 
second, the unique equilibrium has a sequential play with the information advantaged 
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firm leading. If the variance is low and both sequential plays are equilibria, risk 
dominance selects the equilibrium with the information advantaged firm leading.  
Considering that the sequence of play in the price game and correspondingly firm 
payoffs would be different under different information structures, two important 
questions follow: is early information valuable, and will firms buy information? An 
information acquisition stage is then studied and I find that both asymmetric information 
acquisition and no information acquisition could possibly arise. However, that both firms 
buy information is never an equilibrium even if information is free. The time value of 
information may well be negative. This contrasts with the result in my first essay that 
early information has strictly positive value in the quantity game.  
My analyses of endogenous timing in the price game are conducted under the 
assumptions that firms face symmetric demand functions and the mean and variance of 
the demand shock are public information. However, this variance of demand intercept 
may just be firms’ subjective perception of market volatility and, if so, may not be the 
same for both firms. Also, asymmetry can arise from different parameters in the demand 
functions or different production costs of the firms. The algebra would become very 
tedious with any of these asymmetries added to the model. Nonetheless, most of the 
results should still hold in a similar way given that a firm’s payoff function is continuous 





CHAPTER IV  
ESSAY 3: TIMING OF INVESTMENTS AND THIRD DEGREE 
PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN INTERMEDIATE GOOD MARKETS 
 
I study third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets, in which 
costs of production for the downstream firms are determined by their investment choices. 
I focus on the effect of the sequence of firm actions and analyze two models with 
different timing of investments. When investments are chosen before the upstream 
monopolist sets the input prices, under a fairly general condition, the result does not 
differ from previous finding that a less efficient downstream firm receives a discount 
instead of the more efficient one. However, when investments are determined after the 
prices are set, an indirect effect of input prices on the quantity demanded from 
downstream firms must be taken into account, due to the change of investment 
incentives. This causes the upstream firm to possibly charge the more efficient 
downstream firm a lower price. These results are illustrated using linear demand and 
quadratic investment costs. Interestingly, not only the downstream firms but also the 
upstream monopolist prefers the sequence of play in the latter model, i.e. it benefits from 
committing to prices before investments are undertaken. Considering that consumer 
surplus is also improved due to higher output, a change of sequence of play from the first 





Price discrimination in intermediate good markets is prevalent especially in 
countries where such practices are not prohibited or in international markets where 
national antitrust laws do not apply. Perhaps counter-intuitively, models of third degree 
price discrimination have generally shown that a less efficient firm receives a discount 
from the monopolistic upstream firm relative to a more efficient firm. In these models, 
however, the importance of the timing of firm actions has been largely neglected. 
Different sequences of play affect the strategic interactions between firms and can lead to 
different market outcomes. In this essay, I consider that downstream firms make 
complementary investments that lower production cost and then explore the consequence 
of timing of these investments in relation to price setting by upstream monopolist.  
I study two models of vertical structure with different timing of investments made 
by the downstream firms. By saying investments, I mean the general costly activities that 
can be used to lower a firm’s production cost. They may include, but are not limited to, 
R&D expenditures, managerial effort, and the purchase of fixed capital, etc. I show that if 
investment levels are chosen after the monopolist sets the prices of the intermediate good, 
a more efficient firm may end up paying a lower price than a less efficient firm. The 
timing of investments plays an important role: an indirect effect of input price on quantity 
demanded, through the change of downstream firms’ investment incentives, must also be 
taken into account when the monopolist sets the prices before the downstream firms 
invest. Also, I show that a change of sequence from one model (the upstream firm 
commits to input prices first) to the other (the upstream firm sets input prices after 
investments are made) benefits all parties including the upstream monopolist, the 
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downstream firms and the consumers. This suggests firms have a strong incentive to 
structure a vertical relationship to achieve this, and makes the latter model an appealing 
choice for future research. 
While the Anti-Price Discrimination Act of 1936 (often referred to as Robinson-
Patman Act) in the United States concerned primarily intermediate goods markets, most 
economic studies have been on price discrimination in the final goods markets. One of 
the main findings in this literature is that the monopolist should charge more in markets 
with lower elasticity of demand, an optimal pricing rule under third degree 
discrimination.
22
 In a seminal paper, DeGraba (1990) employed a model with a monopoly 
supplier and two downstream producers who engage in Cournot competition in the final 
market. He showed that the supplier charges the lower cost producer a higher price than 
the higher-cost firm under price discrimination, partially offsetting the cost advantage. 
This was confirmed in Yoshida (2000) in an extension to n downstream firms with 
different α-β-efficiency (to produce one unit of the final good, one firm needs more of the 
input and also incurs a higher marginal cost). These theoretical findings are actually 
consistent with the results in final good markets that elasticity is the determinant of price 
charged. Demand for inputs from the lower cost firm is less elastic and thus it should be 
charged a higher price by the upstream firm to maximize profit. What is different in a 
vertical structure, as compared with price discrimination in final good markets, the 
derived demand for the upstream firm’s good is based on a downstream firm’s choice of 
output to supply in the final good market.  
                                                 
22 See, e.g., Tirole (1988), for more discussion. 
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Though theoretically intuitive, it contradicts many people’s expectation that, 
being a larger buyer, a more efficient firm should be able to get a better deal. Katz (1987) 
first argued that a large downstream firm has higher ability to vertically integrate 
backward and consequently should be charged a lower price by the input provider. 
Following a similar spirit, Inderst and Valletti (2009) showed that if there is threat of 
demand-side substitution the more efficient buyer receives a discount. Because the 
transaction cost for finding another supplier of the same inputs can be spread over a 
larger volume, this lower cost buyer is more likely to switch. The additional participation 
constraint leads to a lower price charged to it. Allowing the use of two-part tariff 
contracts, Inderst and Shaffer (2009) also showed that a more efficient firm obtains a 
lower wholesale price than their rivals since in this case the monopolist’s interest is in 
line with the downstream firms. In this essay, I study price discrimination under linear 
pricing, without altering the upstream firm’s monopolistic status. 
Different from the extant literature which exogenously assumes downstream 
firms’ marginal production costs, with one firm’s cost being higher than another, I make 
costs of production endogenous by allowing firms to choose the level of complementary 
investment. One firm is more efficient than another if a lower cost of investment is 
incurred to reduce marginal cost to a same level. I distinguish two types of vertical 
structures which differ in the timing of downstream firms’ investment choice. In a 
supplier-manufacturer type of vertical relationship, as I name it primarily for 
convenience, the marginal cost of a downstream firm is determined by its production 
technology which usually entails large scale investment and long time horizon, and thus 
is assumed to be done before the upstream supplier sets input prices. For a wholesaler-
 
 59 
retailer type of vertical relationship, a downstream firm’s marginal cost in selling 
products in the final market may be highly variable due to choice of complementary 
inputs such as managerial effort, shelf space, etc. In this case, the downstream firms’ 
choices of investment are more likely made after the input price is set and the 
profitability of this product is fully understood. It is worth noting that both DeGraba 
(1990) and Inderst and Valletti (2009) have studied downstream firms’ technology 
choices under price discrimination. The timing in their models would be analogous to my 
first model.
23
 My second model is new to the literature. 
I focus on the case of downstream firms that operate in separate markets. This can 
be due to geographical or technological barriers. For instance, in many countries, one 
mobile service provider is the exclusive contractor with Apple Inc. to provide mobile 
services bundling iPhone products. Because of differences in language and 
telecommunication standards, cross-border shopping is rare and each service provider can 
be seen as a monopolist in its own country.
24
 The assumption of separate markets can 
also be appropriate when the downstream firms pursue monopolistic competition in the 
final good market. A unique branding, distinctive packaging or different after-sale 
services can all grant a firm substantial market power in the short run. Independence 
among final markets greatly reduces the analytical challenges in these three stage models. 
Also, it enables me to do a clear-cut interpretation of the results and compare them with 
                                                 
23 They derive the upstream firm’s pricing rules by directly assuming the downstream firms have different 
production costs and then study their technological choices under such rules assuming they have identical 
investment costs. Difference in production costs actually does not arise. Here, I directly assume different 
investment costs at the very beginning and use an ―integrated‖ three stage model. 
24 Inderst and Valletti (2009) argue that geographic market segmentation is particularly relevant for Europe. 
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the existing literature on price discriminations in the intermediate good markets and in 
the final markets as well.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, I introduce the two 
three-stage models with different timing of the downstream firms’ investment choices to 
study the upstream firm’s pricing strategy and obtain general results. In section 3.3, I 
assume a linear demand function and a quadratic cost function to illustrate the results and 
compare market outcomes under different timing. The last section discusses these two 
models and concludes the essay. 
 
3.2 The Models 
Consider a monopolistic upstream firm which sells an intermediate good to   
downstream firms. To produce each unit of the final good, each downstream firm uses 
one unit of the intermediate good as input. Also, downstream firm i,          , incurs 
a constant marginal cost to transform the intermediate good into the final good. The 
initial level of marginal cost is   , which can be lowered to         by investing into 
the complementary production technology,          .25 I will call              the 
firms’ cost reduction levels, which is in one-to-one correspondence with their chosen 
investments with the following assumptions. The cost of investments is         , with 
     
   
  , 
      
   
   , 
     
   
   and 
      
      
  . Downstream firm  ’s cost efficiency is 
measured by   . Note that a lower value of   represents higher efficiency: if      , 
lowering marginal production cost to any same level would cost firm j more than firm i, 
                                                 
25 It is a common assumption in industrial economics that investment spending lowers a firm’s marginal 
production cost. Specifically, my framing follows Shleifer (1985) and D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). 
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so firm i is more efficient. The last inequality, 
      
      
  , is referred to as the single-
crossing condition in the contract theory literature. Here, it simply says that the marginal 
cost of investment rises with  . I do not consider the trivial case that only fixed cost of 
investment is different for these firms, since in that case their incentives for investment 
will be the same as long as cost reduction is profitable. The upstream firm’s cost of 
supplying the intermediate good is normalized to zero. 
As has been discussed in the introduction, I focus on the circumstance when 
downstream firms operate in n separate markets and each serve as a monopolist in its 
own market. In market i, consumer demand for the final good is represented by    
     ), with   
       . Also, I assume the demand function and investment cost 
function are well behaved such that the optimization problems have their second order 
conditions satisfied and a unique interior solution exists. 
Two models with different sequence of firm actions are analyzed. In the first 
model, the downstream firms choose investment before the upstream monopolist sets the 
price of intermediate goods. This may best characterize a supplier-manufacturers type of 
vertical structure where downstream firms’ production technology usually involves large 
investment and a long time horizon and thus must be done before this vertical 
relationship is built. In the second model, downstream firms’ investment decisions are 
made after the price of intermediate goods is set. This may better represent a wholesaler-
retailers type of vertical structure where costs involved in the selling procedure are easily 
variable in the short run. I call the first model the supplier-manufacturers model (S-M) 
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and the second model the wholesaler-retailer model (W-R). These names are mainly for 
convenience and the timing of the game is what is essential. 
 
3.2.1 The Supplier-Manufacturers model 
Consider a vertical structure in which a monopolistic upstream firm sells an input 
to   downstream firms. As I have noted, in this model, investment levels are chosen 
before the upstream firm sets the input prices. The timing of the game is then: at stage 1, 
downstream firms choose an investment level that lowers their marginal cost of 
production; at stage 2, observing the downstream firms’ costs of production, the upstream 
firm sets input prices,               , where    is the unit price charged to firm  ; 
at stage 3, downstream firms purchase the intermediate goods, produce the final goods 
and sell them in the final markets.  
Using backward induction, I start with the downstream firms’ choice of 
quantities, which also determines their demands for inputs in the intermediate good 
market. In stage 3, given   , the input price charged by the upstream monopolist, and 
     , the cost of production it has chosen in stage 1, downstream firm i’s optimal 
production level (and equivalently the demand for inputs) is given by: 
  
                           .                                                             (6)    
And the second order condition ensuring a unique interior sollution is: 
   
            
       .                                                                                     (7) 
Write             , I have   
     
 
  
        
   , which means a downstream 
firm’s demand for input decreases in the price charged by the upstream firm and 
increases in the cost reduction level it has chosen in the first stage.  
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Then in stage 2, given the cost reduction levels of the downstream firms,   , the 
upstream monopolist then sets input prices   to solve: 
   
 
            
 
   
 
The first order condition determines the input prices charged to each downstream firm: 
             
            .                                                                       (8) 
The second order condition ensuring a unique interior solution is:    
         
      
 . Plugging in   
     and   
     , it can be written as: 
    
        
            
        
      .                                                          (9) 
Write          , I have the following result. (All proofs are in the Appendix.) 
 
Lemma 3.1:   
       
   
  ,  if and only if: 
                                  .                                                            (10) 
 
Condition (10) is stronger than the second order condition (9). Together with (7), 
it implies (9). It is valid for a number of demand functions including linear demand which 
I will use to derive a closed form solution. Other functions satisfying this condition 
include         for    ,     
 
  
 for     and        . Under this 
condition, the benefits from cost reductions taken by the downstream firms will be 
partially appropriated by the upstream firm. Intuitively, investment lowers the 
downstream firm’s cost and raises its profit margin for each unit of production. As a 
result, the value of the input is increased and a higher price can be charged. 
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When condition (10) is satisfied, the downstream firm which has a lower marginal 
cost (determined by its chosen investment level in the first stage) will be charged a higher 
input price by the upstream firm. However, since the appropriation is only partial, with 
identical demand in these final good markets, there is still incentive for the more efficient 
firm to select a lower cost technology, and consequently receive a higher price for each 
unit of the intermediate good.  
 
Proposition 3.1: In the supplier-manufacturers model, the upstream monopolist charges a 
higher price of the intermediate good to the more efficient downstream firm than to a less 
efficient firm if consumer demand is identical in the markets and condition (10) is 
satisfied. 
 
By adding an investment stage before the monopolist setting input prices in which 
the production costs of the downstream firms are endogenized, the result is consistent 
with previous findings that a less efficient firm receives a discount under price 
discrimination. Cost reductions by the downstream firms are only partially appropriated 
by the upstream monopolist, and as a result, there is still incentive for the more efficient 
firm to choose a lower cost technology given its lower cost of investment. The upstream 
firm, after observing their chosen costs, charges the downstream firm with lower 
elasticity of derived demand (the lower production cost firm) a higher input price. 
 
3.2.2 The Wholesaler-Retailers Model 
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I now turn to another model which differs in the timing of firm actions from the 
one discussed earlier. It may better characterize a wholesaler-retailers type of vertical 
structure in which the monopolistic upstream firm is a manufacturer of a consumer 
product under its unique brand name or an exclusive distributor of this manufacturer. 
Final goods sold to consumers may be very close, in a physical sense,
26
 to intermediate 
goods provided by the upstream firm. The downstream firms are mainly in charge of 
selling them to consumers in the final good market. Few, if any, further production 
process is needed. However, the selling procedure may entail some costs which are easily 
variable and heavily impacted by managerial effort. For example, costs involved in 
organizing products on shelves, managing inventory, providing follow-up services, etc. 
How much investment to spend on these procedures is more likely determined after 
prices of the intermediate goods have been set by the upstream firm so that a full cost-
benefit analysis can be conducted. As a result, I make a different assumption on the 
timing of the game that investments to lower production cost are chosen after the 
upstream firm sets the input prices.  
The game is played in the following sequence: in stage 1, the upstream firm sets 
input prices,  , charged to the downstream firms; in stage 2, downstream firms choose an 
investment level that lowers marginal cost of production; and in stage 3, downstream 
firms produce final goods and sell them in the final markets. 
The third stage is the same as before. The optimal quantity is defined by (6) and I 
have the same first and second derivatives for             . In stage 2, given the 
                                                 
26 Before consumers make a purchase from a retailer, extra packaging may be needed at the sales stage. 
Also, after-sale services might be bundled with the physical part of the product. 
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input price,  , which was set by the upstream monopolist in the first stage, downstream 
firm i’s objective function is then:
27
  
   
  
                                            
By plugging the optimal condition for quantity choice in the last stage (6) into the first 
order condition, I have the optimal choice of cost reduction level as defined by: 
           
     
   
  .                                                                                      (11) 
Write             . With the second order condition being satisfied, I can prove the 
following comparative statics: 
 
Lemma 3.2: 
       
   
  , and  
      
   
  . 
 
The first comparative static in Lemma 3.2 says that with higher cost of 
investments, a downstream firm chooses a lower cost reduction level (or equivalently, 
lower investments), holding everything else constant. The second comparative static says 
that being charged a higher input price, the downstream firm chooses a lower cost 
reduction level. This is a very important result since it tells us that the upstream firm’s 
pricing strategy in the first stage would affect a downstream firm’s investment incentives, 
which in turn affect the quantity of inputs demanded from this downstream firm. In 
determining an input price charged to a downstream firm, the upstream monopolist need 
consider both a direct effect and an indirect effect of this price on the derived quantities 
                                                 
27 Since the choices of    and    are made by the same firm, they are effectively simultaneous here. Of 
course, the analytical results are not changed whether I solve them simultaneously or sequentially. 
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demanded as defined by (6). As I have had in the third stage,             ,     
affects    directly, but also indirectly through its effect on   , another determinant of   . 
Suppose that the monopolist increase the price charged on downstream firm i,   , the 
direct effect will cause the downstream firm to decrease its demand of inputs since 
       . But also, this will cause the downstream firm to decrease its investment in the 
cost reduction technology, which again causes    to decrease. This additional effect, as 
compared with that in the supplier-manufacturers model, will indeed affect the upstream 
firm’s optimal pricing strategy. 
In the first stage, the upstream firm’s problem is to solve: 
   
 
                  
 
   
  
The first order condition is then: 
          
     
   
                     .                                                  (12) 
Again, assume the second order conditions are satisfied in all ranges I consider (       
 ). Then, by differentiating (11) with respect to   , I find how the optimal input prices 
vary with respect to the downstream firms’ cost parameters: 
   
   
  
 
     
, where       
     
  
       
  
    
 
     
   
   
      
      
      
.               (13) 
With the denominator being negative, the sign of the partial derivative of the input 
price charged to firm i with respect to its efficiency coefficient is the same as the sign of 




Proposition 3.2: In the wholesaler-retailers model with identical demand in the final 
good markets, the upstream monopolist charges a lower price of the intermediate good to 
the more efficient downstream firm than to a less efficient firm if    , a higher price if 
   , and an equal price if    . 
 
Thus by alternating the sequence of the upstream firm setting input prices and 
downstream firms making investments, I have obtained a result different from that in the 
previous model. The monopolist may charge a lower price to the more efficient firm. The 
first term in   (when divided by       ) accounts for the direct effect of the input price 
on the downstream firm ’s derived demand. Under condition (10),   
     
  
       
  
    
 
   
     
       
     
 
   
        
  
   . As a result, this term is negative since 
      
   
  . That means, 
considering this effect only, the monopolist should charge a more efficient downstream 
firm a higher input price. This is quite intuitive and consistent with the result in the 
supplier-manufacturers model and the literature that the monopolist should charge more 
in markets with lower elasticity of demand under third degree price discrimination. Since 
a more efficient firm will choose a lower cost technology and thus become less flexible 
with respect to its derived demand for the intermediate good, a higher input price can be 
charged. 
However, there is a second term which (when divided by       ) accounts for the 
indirect effect of the input price on the downstream firm’s derived demand. With 
  
      , the sign of it depends on the sign of the cross partial derivative, 
       




measures how a downstream firm’s investment responsiveness with respect to the input 
prices varies for different cost parameters. Since 
      
   
  , if this cross partial derivative 
is positive, that means a less efficient firm (with higher  ) is less responsive to an input 
price change. Then this indirect effect alone leads the monopolist to charge a higher price 
to this firm and a lower price to the more efficient firm. Again, lower elasticity is 
penalized under third degree price discrimination. Together with my earlier discussion, 
the sign of 
   
   
 would depend on which effect has a larger magnitude. If 
       
      
  , then I 
have 
   
   
   and the upstream monopolist should again charge the more efficient 
downstream firm a higher price for the intermediate good.  
Unfortunately, the sign of this cross partial derivative is generally ambiguous 
without additional restrictions placed on the demand function and the cost functions. 
However, under some common assumptions in the literature, when the final good market 
has linear demand and the cost of investment can be expressed as the form      
           , I do have  
       
      
   and a positive second term in  .28 Having obtained 
these general intuitions, in the next section I will assume a specific functional form for 
the market demand and costs of investment to conduct further analyses in these three-
stage models. 
 
                                                 
28 This can be seen by differentiating (6) first by    and then by   . 
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3.3 Timing of Investments 
From the previous section, I find that timing of investments taken by the 
downstream firms play an important role. The strategic interaction between firms is 
affected by the sequence of play and the monopolist’s pricing strategy changes. In the 
wholesaler-retailers model, the monopolist may charge a more efficient downstream firm 
a lower price, which contrasts with some established results from the literature. To 
further the analysis of the timing issue, I assume specific functional forms for the demand 
in the final good market and downstream firms’ costs of investment.  
Linear demand and quadratic investment costs have been widely used in the 
literature of price discrimination and R&D (e.g., D’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988, 
DeGraba 1990). In the following, I assume the inverse demand function in market i is: 
         .                                                                                                       (14) 
I normalize   equal to one by the appropriate adjustment of output units and define 
       to simplify notation.  
Also, assume the costs of investment for downstream firm i is given by:  
            
         .                                                                                (15) 
Firm i is more efficient than firm j if      ,       and       with at least one of the 
first two inequalities being strict.
29
 To ensure that the firms’ objective functions are well 
defined and a unique interior solution exists, I assume the following restrictions on the 
parameters are satisfied: 
(A1)         ; 
                                                 
29 As discussed earlier, the case that only the fixed cost differs would not affect the firms’ incentives of 
investment as long as zero investment is ruled out.  
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(A2)         . 
The coefficient on the linear term (  ) can be positive or negative. But if    is 
negative, I only consider the range where        rises. That is,      
  
   
    if     . 
Also, I assume the constant term    is sufficiently small such that a zero investment 
solution is avoided. Using backward induction same as in the previous section, I can 
solve the equilibrium prices and cost reduction levels. 
In the supplier-manufacturers model, the downstream firms choose: 
   
    
     
      
.                                                                                                   (16) 
And the upstream monopolist sets the input prices as: 
   




     
      
,                                                                                            (17) 
which decreses both in    and in   . As a result, consistent the conclusion in Proposition 
3.1, a less efficient firm is charged a lower price by the upstream monopolist. 
In the wholesaler-retailers model, the downstream firms choose: 
   
    
        






   
    
     
,                                                                           (18) 
and the upstream firm sets the following input prices: 
   





   
.                                                                                                 (19) 








Proposition 3.3: With linear final good market demand and quadratic investment costs, in 
the supplier-manufacturers model, the upstream firm’s optimal pricing rule is:   




     
      
. The more efficient downstream firm is charged a higher input price than the 
less efficient firm. In the wholesaler-retailers model, the upstream firm’s optimal pricing 
rule is  





   
. The more efficient downstream firm (firm i) is charged a lower 





















These results illustrate the general conclusion found in the previous section. Since 
a linear demand function satisfies condition (10), the more efficient downstream firm is 
charged a higher input price than the less efficient firm in the supplier-manufacturers 
model. Also, the result is generally ambiguous in the wholesaler-retailers model. Under 
the assumed functional forms, whether the upstream firm charges a higher or lower price 
to the more efficient firm depends on the ratio of the coefficients on the quadratic term 
and the linear term.  
Thus I find a circumstance under which a more efficient firm receives a discount, 
unlike what has been established in the literature. The timing of investments taken by the 
downstream firms play a critical role: when the upstream firm sets the input prices before 
they choose the investment levels, an indirect effect of the prices on the downstream 
firms’ quantity demanded, through the change of their cost reduction incentives, must be 
taken into consideration in additional to the direct effect. With final good market demand 
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being linear and the costs of investment being quadratic, this indirect effect is in opposite 
direction and may dominate the direct effect, causing the upstream firm to charge a lower 
price to the more efficient firm and a higher price to the less efficient firm. 
An important question that follows is, if a downstream firm can choose the timing 
of its investment, then should it commit to a production technology before the monopolist 
sets the price for the intermediate good or to retain flexibility and choose the investment 
level until the upstream firm has sets the price? This may have rich implications in real 
world situations. 
 
Proposition 3.4: With linear final good market demand and quadratic investment costs, 
  
      
   ,   
      
   , and   
      
   . That is, by remaining flexible 
and choosing its investment level after the price of the intermediate good is set, a 
downstream firm is charged a lower price, chooses a lower cost production technology 
and earns a higher profit than by committing an investment level before the price of the 
intermediate good is set.  
 
This is not surprising. From Lemma 3.2, we learned that a higher input price 
would lower the investment level taken by the downstream firms and consequently the 
quantity demanded, in addition to the direct effect. This is, apparently, in the favor of the 
downstream firm. Thus by remaining flexible and not committing to a production 
technology at that time, a downstream firm is better off by making the monopolist 
consider both effects when setting the input price.  
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What is more interesting, the upstream monopolist also prefers this sequence of 
play, that is, letting the downstream firms choose a production technology after it has set 
the input prices. 
 
Proposition 3.5: With linear final good market demand and quadratic investment costs, 
the monopolist earns a higher profit when downstream firms choose investment after the 
price of the intermediate good is set. Therefore, the upstream firm benefits from 
commitment to a price prior to investment.  
 
Considering that the upstream monopolist charges higher prices in the supplier-
manufacturers model than in the wholesaler-retailers model, this is quite striking result. 
Proposition 3.5 tells that its gain from selling a larger amount of the intermediate good 
outweighs the higher prices it charges for each unit it sells to the downstream firms. Since 
both parties are better off under this sequence of play, the wholesaler-retailers model is 
probably more reasonable to be choosen especially when at least one of the two parties is 
flexible in the timing of its strategies. Of course, commitment in the wholesaler-retailer 
model is problematic: the upstream firm has an incentive to renege on its set price and 
charge a higher price after observing the downstream firm’s investment level. In real 
world settings, signing a contract can easily solve the problem. 
The welfare implication of these comparisons is straightforward. Since all the 
firms gain under the wholesaler-retailers model, and a higher quantity is sold by the 
upstream firm which implies higher final outputs and higher consumer surplus, social 
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welfare is improved in the wholesaler-retailers model when compared to that in the 
supplier-manufacturers model. 
 
Proposition 3.6: With linear final good market demand and quadratic investment costs, 
changing the sequence of play in the supplier-manufacturers model into that in the 
wholesaler-retailers model is a strict Pareto improvement.  
 
Under the supplier-manufacturers model, choosing the lower cost technology by 
investments are partially penalized by a higher input prices set by the upstream firm. This 
causes lower investment levels, lower output level and lower social welfare. This is partly 
corrected when the investment choices are made after the input prices are set in the 
wholesaler-retailers model. An indirect effect will be taken into consideration and the 
monopolistic power of the upstream firm is refrained from harming social welfare, at 
least to some extent.  
  
3.4 Conclusion 
In this essay, I study two models of third degree price discrimination in 
intermediate good markets. Downstream firms’ complementary production technologies 
are endogenously determined by their investments but the timing of investments can be 
either before or after the input prices are set by the upstream monopolist. When 
investments are chosen before the upstream monopolist sets the prices, under a fairly 
general condition, my result does not differ from previous findings that a less efficient 
downstream firm receives a discount instead of the more efficient one. However, when 
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investments are determined after the prices are set, the upstream monopolist may charge 
the more efficient firm a lower price than the less efficient firm. An indirect effect of 
input prices on the quantity demanded from the downstream firms must be taken into 
account, through the change of investment incentives. I illustrate these general results 
using linear demand and quadratic investment costs. Interestingly, both parties in the 
vertical structure prefer the sequence of play in the wholesaler-retailers model. 
Considering that consumer surplus also increases as output is higher, a change of timing 
from the supplier-manufacturers model to the wholesaler-retailers model constitutes a 
strict Pareto improvement. 
The applicability of these models depends on the likely timing of investments, 
before or after prices of intermediate goods are set, and the ability of upstream 
monopolist to commit to a price. In naming the two models, I argued that for a supplier-
manufacturer type of vertical relationship, production cost is mainly determined by 
technological innovations which must be done in a long horizon and thus may be before 
input prices are set. While in a wholesaler-retailer relationship, cost involved in the 
selling process is easily controllable by the downstream firms’ managerial effort and may 
be done after input prices are set. However, this is only for conceptual convenience and 
does not apply to every setting. As was discussed later on, since both parties are better off 
under the sequence of play in the wholesaler-retailers model, it is probably more 
reasonable to choose this model especially when at least one of the two parties is flexible 
in its timing.  
Admittedly, it is also very likely that some portion of the downstream firm’s cost 
is determined before this vertical relationship builds, and the remaining portion is still 
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variable after prices of the intermediate goods are set by the upstream firm. While the 
general ideas within this paper should still apply, the optimal pricing rule will be much 
more complicated as the number of stages expands to four. Also, the welfare effects of 
antitrust regulations (bans of price discriminations in some countries) in these three stage 






CHAPTER V  
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
In this dissertation, I study the determinants and implications of the timing of firm 
actions in a variety of scenarios in industrial economics. The timing of firm actions is an 
important aspect of market competition. It is key to strategic advantage in oligopoly 
models whether firms compete on quantity or on price. In other types of industrial 
relations such as interactions between input suppliers and final-good manufacturers, the 
sequence of play also affects the strategic interaction between the firms. A firm which 
chooses a strategy first will take into account the response by those firms moving second. 
Different sequence of play leads to different market outcomes. 
My first two essays examine how market leadership may arise endogenously in 
oligopoly models and focus on the effect of information about uncertain market demand. 
My first essay studies a quantity game in which firms choose the output levels in one of 
two periods. My second essay studies a price duopoly in which a firm’s action space is 
the price of its product. Due to the different strategic nature of quantity competitions and 
price competitions, quite different results are obtained. In my third essay, I consider that 
downstream firms make complementary investments that lower production cost and then 
explore the consequence of timing of these investments in relation to price setting by 
upstream monopolist.  
In my first essay, by studying a duopoly model of two production periods and 
each firm choosing either period to produce, I find a circumstance under which 
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Stackelberg competition emerges endogenously. Two values are considered in making a 
timing choice: a strategic value of timing and an information value of choosing a quantity 
with knowledge of realized demand. While the firm with early access to information 
about the demand shock captures both of them by producing in the first period, the firm 
with late access may choose to wait until it is informed about the market demand. If the 
variance of the demand shock is high, the information value outweighs the strategic value 
and the information disadvantaged firm becomes the Stackelberg follower. In a general 
oligopoly model with     firms, a GSNC equilibrium with multiple leaders and 
followers emerges endogenously. The number of leaders and followers in equilibrium is 
uniquely determined by the magnitude of demand volatility. 
The value of a perishable information advantage derives from confronting 
competitors with a choice between the strategic disadvantage of following in the market 
and the information disadvantage of being a simultaneous (Cournot) competitor and 
acting based only on expected demand. Considering that the sequence of play and firm 
payoffs would be changed under different information structures, symmetric, asymmetric 
or no information, two natural questions are: is early information valuable in this setting 
and will firms buy information? An information acquisition stage is then studied. I find 
that both symmetric and asymmetric outcomes are possible when information is costly. 
However, Stackelberg equilibrium is supported only when firms have different costs of 
information. With the same information cost, firms play simultaneously even when 
asymmetric information arises from the information acquisition stage. Generally, the time 
value of information is strictly positive: earlier information than its competitor enables 
one firm to either enjoy the information value alone or take a leadership role; information 
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as timely as its competitor prevents one firm from being in a disadvantage, 
informationally or strategically.  
The results in this essay rely only on firms knowing the mean and variance of the 
demand shock. Moreover, this variance may just be firms’ subjective perception of 
market volatility and, if so, does not have to be the same for both firms. The modeling of 
a perishable information asymmetry enables me to assume a general stochastic shock and 
extend the result from a duopoly to the general N-firm case which has not been done 
before. Correspondingly, I study the time value of information, and is the first in the 
endogenous timing literature.  
Following a similar modeling of demand uncertainty and firm information, my 
second essay studies a price competition. In a duopoly model with two price-setting 
periods and both firms choosing to set a price in either period, information about the 
stochastic demand affects a firm’s timing choice. When both firms learn the realized state 
of demand in the first period, sequential play with either firm being the leader is the pure 
strategy equilibrium. This is analogous to the deterministic model studied in the 
literature. However, when both firms learn the realized demand only when uncertainty 
resolves in the second period, simultaneous play equilibrium with both firms choosing to 
delay price setting emerges as the unique equilibrium when the variance of the demand 
intercept is high. As in the first essay, there is an information value of acting with 
knowledge of realized demand given that a firm’s profit is convex on the demand 
intercept.  When the variance of the demand shock is low, strategic timing considerations 
dominate and sequential play equilibrium emerges again. 
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Under asymmetric information with one firm learning the state of demand earlier 
than the other, I find an interesting result that the information advantaged firm may have 
a first-mover advantage. When the variance of demand intercept is high, letting the 
uninformed firm to set a price according to expected demand in the first period lowers 
both firms’ expected profits. Generally, the set of equilibria depends on the magnitude of 
the variance. If the variance is higher than some threshold such that the information 
disadvantaged firm has a dominant strategy to play second, the unique equilibrium has a 
sequential play with the information advantaged firm leading. Instead, if the variance is 
low, then both sequential plays are pure strategy equilibria. However, risk dominance 
selects the equilibrium with the information advantaged firm leading. A perishable 
information advantage leads to a strategic disadvantage of leading in the price game. This 
is actually the more efficient outcome for the industry since the joint profit is higher in 
this equilibrium. 
Considering that the sequence of play in the price game and correspondingly firm 
payoffs would be affected under different information structures, I then study an 
information acquisition stage and two important questions are answered: is earlier 
information valuable, and will firms buy information? I find that both asymmetric 
information acquisitions and no information acquisition could possibly arise. However, 
that both firms buy information is never an equilibrium even when information is free. 
When the other firm acquires information, ignorance of information makes one firm take 
the preferred following role in the equilibrium. As a result, one firm would rather not buy 
information and the time value of information is negative in this circumstance. Even 
when the other firm does not acquire information, to the firm that plays the following role 
 
 82 
in the equilibrium when neither firm learns the demand shock in the first period, the time 
value of information is negative because with earlier information this firm then becomes 
the price leader. The typical information outcome would have one firm acquiring 
information and the other not, especially when the cost of information is low. And such a 
perishable information asymmetry leads to the endogenous price leadership: the 
information advantaged firm becomes the price leader and the information disadvantaged 
firm follows. 
These results of endogenous timing and the time value of information contrast 
with those in the first essay of quality competition. In a quantity duopoly, sequential play 
equilibrium emerges only when firms have asymmetric information and the variance of 
the demand shock is high. The usual outcome would be a simultaneous Cournot 
equilibrium. In the price duopoly, sequential play is the usual equilibrium and 
simultaneous play only occurs when both firms have no information in the first period 
and the variance of the demand shock is high. Also, since following is preferred to 
leading, the time value of information in the price game may be negative, while in the 
quantity game it is always strictly positive. These comparisons advance our 
understanding about the two forms of market competition in industrial organization. 
In the third essay, I endogenize downstream firms’ complementary production 
technologies and study third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets. 
Marginal costs incurred in the production process that transform the intermediate good 
into the final good are reduced when the firms invest in R&D or exert managerial effort. 
One firm is more efficient than another if a smaller investment cost is incurred to lower 
marginal cost to a same level. Two models with different sequence of play are studied. In 
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these three stage models, the timing of investment by downstream firms can be either 
before or after the input prices are set by the upstream monopolist. I focus on the case of 
downstream firms that operate in separate markets. 
When investments are chosen before the upstream monopolist sets the prices, 
under a fairly general condition, the result does not differ from the literature that a less 
efficient downstream firm receives a discount instead of the more efficient one. Higher 
input price leads to lower demand from the downstream firms but the demand from a 
more efficient firm is less elastic. The optimal pricing strategy suggests charging this 
inelastic firm a higher price. However, when investments are determined after the prices 
are set, an indirect effect of input prices on the quantity demanded from the downstream 
firms must be taken into account, through the change of investment incentives. This may 
be in the opposite direction to the direct effect that higher input price causes lower 
demand but a more efficient firm is less flexible. As a result, the upstream monopolist 
may charge the more efficient firm a higher or lower price than the less efficient firm 
depending on the magnitudes of these effects.  
With linear demand and quadratic investment costs, I show that the more efficient 
firm indeed ends up receiving a lower input price when the ratio of the cost parameters, 
   , is higher than that of the less efficient firm. Interestingly, both parties in the vertical 
structure prefer the sequence of play in the latter model. That is, the upstream firm 
commits to the prices of the intermediate good first, and the downstream firms chooses a 
production technology second. While the prices of the intermediate good charged by the 
upstream firm is lower, investment level chosen by a downstream firm and its output are 
both larger in this model. This higher quantity dominates the effect of lower input price 
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and makes the upstream monopolist also enjoy a higher profit. Considering that consumer 
surplus increases with output, a change of timing from the former model to the latter 
constitutes a strict Pareto improvement. 
Looking forward, there are many topics related to my work here that are open for 
future endeavors. For example, an important extension to the model studied in my first 
essay is to allow for entry and thus identify a competitive equilibrium. A signaling 
dynamic under incomplete information about market demand has only been studied for 
quantity games previously and seems also interesting for a price competition setting. On 
price discrimination in intermediate good markets, if downstream firms pursue Bertrand 
competition in the final good market, interesting result about the upstream monopolist’s 
optimal pricing strategy may be obtained. All these can further advance the literature on 















Albaek, Svend. 1990. ―Stackelberg Leadership as a Natural Solution under Cost 
Uncertainty.‖ Journal of Industrial Economics, 38(3): 335-347. 
Amir, Rabah, and Isabel Grilo. 1999. ―Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium.‖ 
Games and Economic Behavior, 26(1): 1–21. 
Amir, Rabah, and Anna Stepanova. 2006. ―Second-Mover Advantage and Price 
Leadership in Bertrand Duopoly.‖ Games and Economic Behavior, 55(1): 1-20. 
Arozamena, Leandro, and Federico Weinschelbaum. 2009. ―Simultaneous vs. 
Sequential Price Competition with Incomplete Information.‖ Economics Letters, 
104(1): 23-26. 
Benoit, Jean-Pierre, and Vijay Krishna. 1987. ―Dynamic Duopoly: Prices and 
Quantities.‖ Review of Economic Studies, 54(1): 23-35. 
Bolton, Patrick, and Mathias Dewatripont. 2006. Contract Theory. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Cowan, Simon. 2007. ―The Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination with 
Nonlinear Demand Functions.‖ RAND Journal of Economics, 38(2): 419-428. 
van Damme, Eric, and Sjaak Hurkens. 1999. ―Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership.‖ 
Games and Economic Behavior, 28(1): 105–129. 
van Damme, Eric, and Sjaak Hurkens. 2004. ―Endogenous Price Leadership.‖ Games 
and Economic Behavior, 47(2): 404–420. 
Daughety, Andrew F., and Jennifer F. Reinganum. 1994. ―Asymmetric Information 
Acquisition and Behavior in Role Choice Models: An Endogenously Generated 
Signaling Game.‖ International Economic Review, 35(4): 795-819. 
 
 87 
DeGraba, Patrick. 1987. ―The Effects of Price Restrictions on Competition between 
National and Local Firms.‖ RAND Journal of Economics, 18(3): 333-347. 
DeGraba, Patrick. 1990. ―Input-Market Price Discrimination and the Choice of 
Technology.‖ American Economic Review, 80(5): 1246–1253. 
Deneckere, Raymond J., and Dan Kovenock. 1992. ―Price Leadership.‖ Review of 
Economic Studies, 59(1): 143-162. 
Dowrick, Steve. 1986. ―von Stackelberg and Cournot Duopoly: Choosing Roles.‖ RAND 
Journal of Economics, 17(2): 251–260. 
Echenique, Federico, and Aaron S. Edlin. 2004. ―Mixed Equilibria Are Unstable in 
Games of Strategic Complements.‖ Journal of Economic Theory, 118(1): 61-79. 
Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. 1991. Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Gal-Or, Esther. 1985. ―First Mover and Second Mover Advantages.‖ International 
Economic Review, 26(3): 649-653. 
Gal-Or, Esther. 1987. ―First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information.‖ Review of 
Economic Studies, 54(2): 279-292. 
Hamilton, Jonathan H., and Steven M. Slutsky. 1990. ―Endogenous Timing in 
Duopoly Games: Stackelberg or Cournot Equilibria.‖ Games and Economic 
Behavior, 2(1): 29-46. 
Harsanyi, John C., and Reinhard Selten. 1988. A General Theory of Equilibrium 
Selection in Games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Hauk, Esther, and Sjaak Hurkens. 2001. ―Secret Information Acquisition in Cournot 
Markets.‖ Economic Theory, 18(3): 661-681. 
 
 88 
Inderst, Roman, and Greg Shaffer. 2009. ―Market Power, Price Discrimination, and 
Allocative Efficiency in Intermediate-Goods Markets.‖ RAND Journal of 
Economics, 40(4): 658–672. 
Inderst, Roman, and Tommaso Valletti. 2009. ―Price Discrimination in Input 
Markets.‖ RAND Journal of Economics, 40(1): 1–19. 
Katz, Michael L. 1987. ―The Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in 
Intermediate-Goods Markets.‖ American Economic Review, 77(1): 154–167. 
Klemperer, Paul, and Margaret Meyer. 1986. ―Price Competition vs. Quantity 
Competition: The Role of Uncertainty.‖ RAND Journal of Economics, 17(4): 618-
638. 
Kreps, David M., and Jose A. Scheinkman. 1983. ―Quantity Precommitment and 
Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes.‖ Bell Journal of Economics, 14(2): 
326-337. 
Mailath, George J. 1993. ―Endogenous Sequencing of Firm Decisions.‖ Journal of 
Economic Theory, 59(1): 169-182. 
Malueg, David A. 1993. ―Bounding the Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price 
Discrimination.‖ American Economic Review, 83(4): 1001-1021. 
Matsumura, Toshihiro, and Akira Ogawa. 2009. ―Payoff Dominance and Risk 
Dominance in the Observable Delay Game: A Note.‖ Journal of Economics, 97(3): 
265-272. 
Normann, Hans-Theo. 1997. ―Endogenous Stackelberg Equilibria with Incomplete 
Information.‖ Journal of Economics, 66(2): 177-187. 
 
 89 
Normann, Hans-Theo. 2002. ―Endogenous Timing with Incomplete Information and 
with Observable Delay.‖ Games and Economic Behavior, 39(2): 282-291. 
Pastine, Ivan, and Tuvana Pastine. 2004. ―Cost of Delay and Endogenous Price 
Leadership.‖ International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22(1): 135-145. 
Robson, Arthur J. 1990. ―Duopoly with Endogenous Strategic Timing: Stackelberg 
Regained.‖ International Economic Review, 31(2): 263-274. 
Saloner, Garth. 1987. ―Cournot Duopoly with Two Production Periods.‖ Journal of 
Economic Theory, 42(1): 183-187. 
Schmalensee, Richard. 1981. ―Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-
Degree Price Discrimination.‖ American Economic Review, vol. 71(1), pp. 242-247. 
Schwartz, Marius. 1990. ―Third-Degree Price Discrimination and Output: Generalizing 
a Welfare Result.‖ American Economic Review, 80(5): 1259-1262. 
Shleifer, Andrei. 1985. ―A Theory of Yardstick Competition.‖ RAND Journal of 
Economics, 16(3): 319-327. 
Sherali, Hanif D. 1984. ―A Multiple Leader Stackelberg Model and Analysis.‖ 
Operations Research, 32(2): 390-404. 
Singh, Nirvikar, and Xavier Vives. 1984. ―Price and Quantity Competition in a 
Differentiated Duopoly.‖ RAND Journal of Economics, 15(4): 546-554. 
Spencer, Barbara J., and James A. Brander. 1992. ―Pre-commitment and Flexibility: 
Applications to Oligopoly Theory.‖ European Economic Review, 36(8): 1601-1626. 
von Stackelberg, Heinrich F. 1934. Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Vienna: Springer 
Verlag. 
Tirole, Jean. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
 90 
Varian, Hal R. 1985. ―Price Discrimination and Social Welfare.‖ American Economic 
Review, 75(4): 870-875. 
Vives, Xavier. 1984. ―Duopoly Information Equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand.‖ 
Journal of Economic Theory, 34(1): 71-94. 
Vives, Xavier. 1985. ―On the Efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria with Product 
Differentation.‖ Journal of Economic Theory, 36(1): 166-175. 
Yoshida, Yoshihiro. 2000. ―Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Output 











Proof of Proposition 1.1: 
First, Firm 1 has a strictly dominant strategy to act in   : 











, if Firm 2 chooses to produce in    ; and 











, if Firm 2 
chooses to produce in      
Given that Firm 1 chooses to produce in   , Firm 2’s expected payoff is then 
      
 
 if it chooses   , and 





 if it chooses   . The condition for Firm 2 to 
choose    is then 






      
 
 , which can be solved as condition (1). Otherwise, 
it chooses to produce in   . ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.2: 
If condition (1) holds, the equilibrium outputs are given by (2), and   
     
   if 
       . If condition (1) does not hold, the equilibrium outputs are given by (3), and 
  
     
   if      . Also notice that with the price of the product being the same, Firm 
2 has a (weakly) higher markup per unit than Firm 1. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.3: 
First, no    firm wants to delay production: regardless of the number of other 
firms producing in each period, nothing is gained but the strategic value is lost for an    
firm when producing in   . I can show it mathematically in a more general case. For an 
   firm k, suppose the number of all other firms choosing to produce in    is     and 
within them        are    firms; the rest     firms choose to produce in    and 
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       out of them are    firms. Firm k’s expected profit by choosing    is 
  
           
 
  
      
      
, which is greater than 
  
            
 
  
      
       
, the expected 
profit by choosing   . And this is independent of the values of  ,   ,  ,      
Then conditioning on that all    firms produce in period one, I solve the output 
and expected profit for each    firm. Denote   
 
            and   
 
            
as the output level and profit of an    firm, which produces in period   , if   of the    
firms produce in period one and the other      firms produce in period two, where   is 
an integer subject to       . By solving backwards, I have the following equilibrium 
output levels in the quantity subgame: 
  
             
 
      
 
  
    
, 
  
             
 
      
, 
  
             
 
                
 
  
              
; 
and expected payoffs are: 
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, 
    
              
  
        
         
  
  
      
         
 . 
Three cases need to be considered. First, if at least one but not all    firms 
produce in period    (      ), no    firm deviates if and only if ( )     
     
             
                 , that is, no    firm who produces in period 
one wants to delay production, and ( )     
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     , that is, no    firm who produces in period two has an incentive to advance 
production. Solving ( ) I have the first inequality of the condition in (ii), and solving ( ) 
I have the second inequality. Second, if all    firms produce in period    (   ), then 
no    firm deviates if and only if ( ) is satisfied. The condition in (i) is just the first 
inequality of the condition in (ii) evaluated at    . Third, if all firms produce in period 
   (    ), then no    firm deviates if and only if ( ) is satisfied. And the condition in 
(iii) is just the second inequality of the condition in (ii) evaluated at     . 
To see that the number of leading (and following) firms is uniquely determined, I 
only need to show that           is strictly decreasing in   for           . Then for 
any     , it falls into one and only one interval as specified in (i), (ii) and (iii). To 
show that, take a derivative of      with respective to  : 
          
  
       
                      
          
  
           
         
          
  
            
         
          
  
          
       
The sum of the first two terms in the brackets is weakly negative when      
 , since 
                   
          
  
          
         
          
   
         
          
  .  
The sum of the last two terms is strictly negative since 
           
         
          
  
         
   
          
         
 
                
    
 
  
  . This is because 
          
 
        
   when       , and 
        
 








Proof of Lemma 1.1: 
The following reduced game at the prestage is obtained when (NB, NB) is the 
outcome from the information acquisition stage: 
 
Table 1.2 The Reduced Game of Timing Choice under (NB, NB) 
  










































Solving this game gives the result. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.4: 
The game in the information acquisition stage has four possible cases, subject to 
existence, based on possible equilibria in the extended games when neither firm buys 
information and when only one firm buys information.  
Case 1:    
 
 
   and     . Firms produce simultaneously in    under (NB, 









Table 1.3 The Reduced Game of Information Acquisition - 1 
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Case 2:    
 
 
   and     . Firms produce simultaneously in    under (NB, 
NB), and sequentially under (B, NB) or (NB, B) with the firm buying information leading. 
However, with   
 
 
,   
 
 
  , a contradiction. 
Case 3:    
 
 
   and     . Firms produce simultaneously in    under (NB, 
NB) and simultaneously in    under (B, NB) or (NB, B). The game in the information 
acquisition stage is: 
 
Table 1.4 The Reduced Game of Information Acquisition - 2 
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Case 4:    
 
 
   and     . Firms produce simultaneously in    under (NB, 
NB), and sequentially under (B, NB) or (NB, B) with the firm buying information leading. 





Table 1.5 The Reduced Game of Information Acquisition - 3 
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Solving these games, and noting that     
 
 
, I prove the result. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.5: 
Stackelberg equilibrium arises only when firms have asymmetric information and 
condition (1) is satisfied. When   
 
 
, I have 
 
 
    . As a result, both conditions (iia) 
and (iib) in Proposition 1.4 violate condition (1). ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.6: 
Similar to the proof of Proposition 1.3, if     , I have firms produce 
simultaneously in    under (NB, NB), and sequentially under (B, NB) or (NB, B). The 
game in the information acquisition stage is then: 
 
Table 1.6 The Reduced Game of Information Acquisition - 4 
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Under the condition specified in the proposition, (B, NB) is the unique equilibrium 
and Stackelberg competition with Firm 1 leading emerges in the extended game under (B, 
NB). ■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2.1:  
The payoffs of the reduced game in the prestage of timing choice are obtained by 
taking an expectation of the ex post payoffs in the price games corresponding to each 
outcomes of firms’ timing choices. The reduced game is: 
 
Table 2.2 The Reduced Game of Timing Choice under (B, B) 
  
 Firm 2 
T1 T2 
Firm 1 
T1         ,                  ,          
T2         ,                  ,          
 
With      , (  ,   ) and (  ,   ) are the only pure strategy equilibria. ■  
 
Proof of Proposition 2.1: 
Using the expected payoffs in the basic games corresponding to each sequence of 







Table 2.3 The Reduced Game of Timing Choice under (NB, NB) 
  
 Firm 2 
T1 T2 
Firm 1 
T1    ,        ,          
T2         ,             ,          
 
Apparently, (  ,   ) is not an equilibrium. For (  ,   ) to be an equilibrium, I 
need             , which can be solved as       , where   
  
      
. 
Otherwise, one firm would deviate by playing the leadership role and both sequential 
moves are equilibria. ■  
 
Proof of Proposition 2.2: 
From the payoff matrix, I have     
             
         if and only if 
   
  
     
  . For firm  , I always have     
             
        . ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.3: 
Solving the reduced game in Table 2.1 directly gives the results. ■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2.2: 
From Proposition 2.2, and note that   
  
     
, I have that both firms prefer being 
the follower if       . ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.4: 
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Compare the products of deviation losses of the two equilibria in Table 2.1 when 
      . With      ,                                      
  2   2. So, the equilibrium with firm   leading risk dominates the other. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.5: 
The equilibrium in the extended game under (NB, NB) depends on whether the 
condition        is satisfied. If it is satisfied, equilibrium in each of the extended 
games under (NB, NB), (B, NB), (NB, B) is unique. But the extended games under (B, B) 
will have two sequential play equilibria. As a result, two cases need to be discussed in the 
information acquisition stage. If       , the extended games under both (B, B) and 
(NB, NB) will have multiple equilibria. Then there are four cases to be discussed in the 
information acquisition stage. 
When       : 
Case 1: If (     ) under (     ) and (     ) under (   ), the reduced game in 
the information acquisition stage can be written as: 
 








          ,                      ,          
NB 




In this case, (    ) is the unique equilibrium if and only if      , and 
(     ) is the unique equilibrium if and only if      . 
Case 2: If (     ) under (     ) and (     ) under (   ), the reduced game of 
information acquisition can be written as: 
 








          ,                      ,          
NB 
        ,                ,          
 
In this case, (    ) is the unique equilibrium if and only if      , and 
(     ) is the unique equilibrium if and only if      . 
Case 3: If (     ) under (     ) and (     ) under (   ), the reduced game of 
information acquisition can be written as: 
 








          ,                      ,          
NB 
        ,                           
 
In this case, (    ) is the unique equilibrium if and only if      , and 
(     ) is the unique equilibrium if and only if      . 
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Case 4: If (     ) under (     ) and (     ) under (   ), the reduced game of 
information acquisition can be written as: 
 








          ,                      ,          
NB 
        ,                     ,     
 
In this case, (    ) is the unique equilibrium if and only if      , and 
(     ) is the unique equilibrium if and only if      . 
Due to symmetry of the firms, all four cases yield the same conditions for both 
symmetric and asymmetric outcomes to arise in the information stage. Thus when 
      , equilibrium outcomes can be summarized as: one firm buys information and 
the other not if and only if      ; neither firm buys information if and only if   
   . 
When       : 
Case 1: If (     ) under (   ), the reduced game of information acquisition can 















          ,                      ,          
NB 
        ,                     ,          
 
In this case, (    ) and (    ) are equilibria if and only if      , and 
(     ) is the unique equilibrium if and only if      . 
Case 2: If (     ) under (   ), the reduced game of information acquisition can 
be written as: 
 








          ,                      ,          
NB 
        ,                     ,          
 
In this case, (    ) and (    ) are equilibria if and only if      , and 
(     ) is the unique equilibrium if and only if      . 
Both cases yield the same result since the payoffs under (   ) do not matter: 
(   ) is never an equilibrium outcome. Thus when       , equilibrium outcomes can 
be summarized as: one firm buys information and the other not if and only if      
         ; neither firm buys information if and only if               . 
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Different from when       , here both asymmetric information acquisitions are 
equilibria if cost of information is low. 
Combining the preceding results and representing the conditions as an expression 
of the variance of demand intercept, I prove the proposition. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.6: 
This is proved by direct comparisons of payoffs in each case in the proof of 
Proposition 2.5. Setting    , if one firm strictly prefers not to obtain information given 
the other firm’s choice of information, then early information has a strictly negative 
value. If one firm is indifferent between acquiring and not acquiring information, then 
early information has zero value. The first statement follows from the fact that (   ) is 
never an equilibrium outcome with one firm strictly preferring to deviate and the other 
being indifferent. The second statement follows from the fact that when       , only 
one of the firms chooses to buy information and is the unique asymmetric equilibrium 
when information is free. ■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 3.1: 
From (8), 
       
   
  
       
  
       
     
  
       
    . Also, 
       
   
 
      
  
       
   
 
       
    
  




       
   
 
        
 
            
           
  which is greater than zero if and 
only if (10) is satisfied. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.1: 
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In the first stage, downstream firm i’s choice of investment (equivalently, choice 
of cost reduction   ) is determined by solving the following problem: 
   
  
                                                  
The first order condition implicitly defines the optimal level of effort: 
                    
     
      
   
   
             
      
   
    
   
   
            
     
   
    
With the second order condition being satisfied and 
      
      
  , differentiate the above 
with respect to    and I obtain 
   
   
  , which means a more efficient downstream firm 
chooses a lower cost technology. Together with Lemma 3.1, I prove the proposition. ■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 3.2:  
From (11), I have 
       
   
 
      
      
    
      
   
 
  , given that the denominator is negative 
(the second order condition). Also, 
       
   
  
  
    
      
   
 
  . ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.4: 
Comparing (16) to (18), and (17) to (19), I have   
      
    and   
    
  
   . In the wholesaler-retailer model, if firm i were to choose      
   , its profit is 
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     which is greater than   
    
 
    
      




      
     since   
      
   . And   
         
    . ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.5: 
In the supplier-manufacturers model, the upstream monopolist’s profit from 
market i is  
   
    
 
 
     
      
      
      
       




while in the wholesaler-retailers model, its profit is 
   
    
 
 
     
      
      
    
         
 
          
  
It can be easily verified that    
       
    when     . ■ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.6: 
Proposition 3.4 and Proposition 3.5 indicate that all firms earn a higher profit 
under the wholesaler-retailers model. Also by Proposition 4, final output in market i is 
  
    
 
 
     
      
     in the wholesaler-retailers model, greater than the final 
output in the supplier-manufacturers model   
    
 
 
     
      
    . As a result, 
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